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account, the meeting ruled that the cause of the marriage breakdown was the husband's refusal to allow her to enter his garden. The attempted seduction, the adultery, the escapades to Port Moresby, the violent words and acts that had characterised the marriage over the years were all declared to be blameworthy, but the most serious of the offences was the husband's act in denying his wife entry to the taro garden. This signified the breaking off of the basic exchange relation in a marriage whereby the man clears the garden, the wife harvests the taro, and cooks it, and the husband and wife both eat it. I was told that when this exchange relation is broken, the marriage itself breaks down.

Why it is the taro garden where exchange between husband and wife is so important will be discussed in Chapter VI. I am concerned here to show that in tracing the cause of a marriage breakdown, what the Orokaiva seem to be looking for is evidence of a breakdown in the area of gift exchange. As long as the husband still gives his wife taro, there may be considerable difficulties between them, but these are not *defined* as a breakdown in Orokaiva culture unless there is a breakdown in Obligatory exchange.

Another such case was that of a man who took sides in a quarrel between his brother and another man who had been trying to rape, i.e. seduce by force, that brother's wife. I thought that the village generally would be on the brother's side, as rape is disapproved of, but almost everyone took the side of the rapist and the man who took the side of his brother had to leave the village. The man who was expelled had a long history of trouble making. During my stay he had been involved in every fight except those between husbands and wives. He had also committed rape, his victim being a prohibited partner under the incest rules. His trouble was, so I was told, that no woman wanted him. I asked my informants why this was. The reason was that he had been married previously, he had maltreated his wife and she had run away. Now nobody would help him. And why would nobody help him? Well, brideprice had been paid for his first wife; it had been lost through his fault, and that was the 'real' reason why nobody supported him in the quarrel. Here again we notice that the cause of the trouble was the breakdown of an exchange cycle. When a man has been helped in paying brideprice he has an obligation towards his clansmen to hold his wife, raise a family and be a support for the others. He must manage the relationship with his own affines properly and make them into valuable exchange partners.

In both instances a basic exchange cycle had been broken and that was thought to constitute the essence of the relationship. In the first case this was the exchange between man and woman in making their own contributions and deriving their own benefits in the taro garden – a cycle of exchange which parallels the cultivation cycle of the taro itself. In the second case it was the exchange between clansmen which is complete only when the man who received the brideprice provides recruits for the clan, as well as a steady new affinal alliance. It does not concern me here whether psychologists would, in such cases, accept the exchange breakdown as the real cause of the social breakdown; I have illustrated that the Orokaiva view social breakdowns in this manner.

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613 Previous research such as that of Rimoldi (1966) has shown clearly enough that the Orokaiva patrilineage is not *in practice* an enduring corporate group. The model I am proposing here goes further: it states a rule according to which [428] patrimonies are fragmented and the fragments constituted into new units. It follows from this rule that neither lineage membership nor the principle of patrifiliation (cf. Barnes 1962, 1967) suffices to account for the inheritance of landed estates.

596 The basic condition for inheritance is that there should be a continuing filial 428 or quasi-filial relation, usually based on co-residence and filial services, thus inducing the *enda mama* to make an appropriate response and continue the protection of the real or fictive junior, as symbolised by the transfer of land, often in gradual steps during the *enda mama's* lifetime.

Having shown that patrifiliation is not a sufficient condition for land inheritance, we shall proceed in the next section to show that it is also not a necessary condition. This argument will be followed by an exposition of an alternative model based on the principle of exchange.

5. *Transfers of Land outside the Corporate Group*

423 The land transfers so far discussed were conducted between agnates and largely 425 prescribed by rules of inheritance. We have seen that there is some freedom of disposition, as the father is not obliged to transmit more than half of his land to [428] his sons. His freedom is even greater if he has no resident sons or brothers. Even a man with many sons and brothers, and with only limited land holdings, is not prevented from making occasional land transfers, though these are more likely to be on only a temporary basis.

423 The extent of known transfers outside the rules of patrilineal succession has 425 been recorded for the villages of Sivepe and Inonda. In Sivepe more than half of 613 104 parcels of land belonging to the Jegase clan have been so transferred (Rimoldi 1966:59) whereas only 15 out of 34 gardens investigated were planted 614 by primary members of the right-holding lineage (*ibid.*: 70). In Inonda, the proportion was 20 out of 55 (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:34). Recipients were sometimes members of the same clan but of a different lineage: sometimes they were members of another clan. The whole of the land now occupied by the Andiriha clan of Inonda was donated by the Tandai'undi of Seva in 1915, when they were affines.

423 Most of these transfers were made to sisters and daughters of the *enda mama* and, by implication, to the men who had married these women. They were most 425 commonly full sisters and full daughters, but there are many cases involving 583 classificatory and adoptive relationships. The making of such gifts depends partly on inclination; a man who greatly dislikes his son-in-law will not settle land on him. If the daughter marries outside a radius of about three miles from the home village, she usually receives no land. Many women who marry in a [593] neighbouring village receive land close to the boundary. The popular explanation of such gifts is the deep love between a man and his sister (or his daughter). [582] There is, however, another consideration which may have encouraged these transfers: the Orokaiva practised preferential patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, so that a village which allowed a woman to cultivate land, while married in an

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adjoining village, might receive land at a later date when that woman's daughter married, according to the rule, in her mother's home village. This kind of pattern is described by Hogbin (1967:24) for the Wogeo, who operate a system of land dowries in conjunction with second-degree patrilateral cross-cousin marriage.

Often land is granted, on a temporary or even life-long basis, to persons other than sisters or daughters. Land transfers may arise in a variety of social relationships which cannot be easily categorised. In Inonda, where the village domain is rather large, land is often lent by one lineage to another so that cultivation areas can be close together or contiguous. This is done because people like to work at not too great a distance from one another. In Sivepe, some land loans were made from a similar motive, mostly for rubber gardens. When migrants from Garombi[2] settled in Sivepe, several grants of land were made to them, both for taro and yam gardens. Such arrangements do not usually extend beyond the life time of the recipient although I do know of exceptions. If the gift endures, it signifies a close and permanent bond between families who may be unrelated by kinship.

From the viewpoint I have adopted in this work, two questions are of special interest in the analysis of land transfers: what social benefits are being exchanged between the partners; and what are the symbolic motives for using land as an object of mediation in these relationships? In order to approach these questions, I shall first cite some situations in which land transfers are of practical use and common occurrence:

1. Land transfers from wife's father to daughter's husband used to be very common, especially in the early years of marriage. A man was expected to help his wife's father with gardening and other tasks, and to stay with him for a year or so. During this period, the father-in-law gave the couple a garden for their own use. On occasion, this might be a garden to which the daughter had been granted a permanent usehold. This type of bride-service is very much on the decline today, as the payment of a substantial bridewealth in money acts as a substitute. I encountered the custom once or twice and found that the son-in-law regarded himself as the father-in-law's 'worker' or servant. We may therefore regard this type of land transfer as offering to the donor the satisfaction of seeing the receiver reduced in social status.

2. In the other types of cases I shall mention, transfers of land do not place recipients in a position of social inferiority. Certainly, in many cases harvest gifts are expected from the borrowers of land but these tend to be small in size and to lack any implications of status difference. For instance, many transfers are made by widowers. These men have a choice between attaching themselves to the family of a son, a daughter or a sister's son. In Sivepe, I found that each of these choices was made twice in a total of six cases with which I am familiar. In all the cases where an old man attached himself to a daughter or sister's son, he made transfers of land to those who looked after him. The choice he makes is prompted primarily by mutual affection but nonetheless his position is greatly strengthened by the knowledge that he has some tangible way of showing his gratitude, namely in the form of land. If he is unhappy with one relative and moves to another, some part of his inheritance will probably move with him.

3. Cripples and widows are often in a similar position. They may need a

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423 man to take responsibility while their sons are still too young. This man will
431 'look after' their land in an economic, political and religious sense and will restore
736 it to the son or sons when they come of age. But in the cases of which I have knowledge, some land is likely to stay with the protector, who often becomes an heir of the widow or cripple.

423 4. In all the cases mentioned so far land is an object representing
591 respectable status and exchangeable for services of a quasi-filial nature. The same applies to most instances I know of uxorilocal marriage. Here it was usually the
583 wife's relatives who desired the husband to stay with them, whereas the latter had no pressing reasons to leave his home village. They were generous in their offers of land, and no sensible man would move without such inducement. After the eruption of Mount Lamington, the survivors of the Sangara tribe, greatly reduced in numbers, offered generous land portions, on a wholly permanent basis, to men who would marry uxorilocally. Widowers dependent on the care of their daughters will encourage uxorilocal marriage in the same way. (The frequency of uxorilocal marriage among the Orokaiva is between 5 and 10 per cent.) In these cases it is clear that land donors are motivated by the desire to attract the son-in-law, and that the son-in-law is motivated by pleasure at the status he will gain as symbolised by the land he is allowed to 'look after'.

423 5. A very similar motivation may be found for the land transfers made in
425 Sivepe in 1966–7 to families who had migrated from neighbouring Garombi. Seeking an increase in population, Sivepe leaders frequently encouraged dissident
166 minorities in some neighbouring villages to join them. When the Garombi people came, a good deal of effort was made to obligate them and attract their friendship and loyalty. Two men gave useholds over gardens and one man gave a usehold over three yam gardens. It is likely that there were other transfers as well, just before I left the field and afterwards. One of the men who received a taro garden started using the donor's plant emblem when working in that garden, thus emphasising the closeness of the bond with the donor's family, as plant emblems are normally transmitted only by descent. Here the donors were motivated by a desire to attach the immigrants more closely to themselves, and the recipients gave friendship and loyalty in return. Here, as in uxorilocal residence, the migrants' willingness to settle in the village was itself treated as a benefit bestowed upon the local people by the migrants.

423 6. As already mentioned, the transfer of land to sisters and daughters is
428 very common. It is the rule that, in the absence of brothers and sons, sisters and
425 daughters should inherit land in preference to second degree kin. I know of several instances where absent brothers and sons were overlooked in favour of sisters and daughters resident in the village. Even if brothers and sons are living in the village, some land may be transferred to females. This will occur especially if a daughter's or sister's husband is known to be short of gardening land. In addition, it may occur for the kind of reasons given by Lawrence in his discussion of land transfers among the Garia, i.e. the enhanced status gained by the mother's brother when he acquires a junior follower strongly dependent on
[554] him. Among the Orokaiva where the majority of people marry close to home, a man's generosity to his sister may yield him quite a number of loyal supporters if the sister happened to have many children.

423 7. Land is sometimes made available by an individual *enda mama* for a
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

6. *Case Study of Uterine Land Inheritance*

If a person resides at too great a distance to make gardens on his land, he commonly passes it on to a suitable kinsman to be 'looked after', which means the establishment of gardens on it at regular intervals and the performance of religious rites. After a decent interval (perhaps twenty years), the caretakers will begin to press for a permanent arrangement: does the owner intend to return or will he pass over his land permanently to a resident? It is possible to stall on such a decision for a long time, but even if the owner's rights have the strongest basis, viz. patrilineal inheritance, they gradually become more tenuous and the man who looks after the land increasingly becomes the real master. Theoretically, [428] however, the right to patrimony land is never extinguished. At the same time, a land gift to a sister or daughter is often made on the basis that when the land [431] passes to her male heir he will be able to keep it permanently for his descendants. The formal rules on this point are flagrantly contradictory. If we wish to understand the principles behind uterine land inheritance, our most useful course will be to consider how the system operates in a concrete case.

The data I shall discuss here were reported in Crocombe's and Hogbin's study 614 of Inonda (1963) and supplemented in a brief study by myself. A leading man 423 from Tandai'undi clan (Seva village) gave most of the present Inonda domain to a leading man of Andiriha clan. The Andiriha made various gifts at that time 425 (1915) and also gave Tandai'undi two women in marriage. In the following [583] generation Tandai'undi, according to the custom (of patrilateral cross-cousin [582] marriage), gave two women in exchange to Andiriha, or to be precise, to the son of the donor of the original two women. It was then promised that the son of the elder of these two women would assume control and be permitted to pass on this land to his heirs.

In the 1950s several incidents occurred which emphasised the limitations of the rights of Andiriha. When some Tandai'undi were dismissed from a construction job (by a European overseer), they went to Inonda village where the foreman, an Andiriha, lived. They reminded the foreman that Inonda was 'their' land and that if he wanted to remain on it he had better get them their jobs back (Crocombe and Hogbin (1963: 72). As I have pointed out, a land borrower always has a duty to protect the interests of the lender and this

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add lustre to a feast or to economise on domestic pig. Informants told me that for most ceremonial purposes, wild and domestic pig are interchangeable. In general, therefore, one may say that pigs are reared in order to provide a bigger and more dependable supply of pork. I was unable to discover any instance of a rule requiring *only* wild pig to be used for any kind of ceremony and declaring domesticated pig to be unsuitable. On the other hand certain ceremonial gifts of pigs are made between affines, where a rule stipulates that the pig *must* have been reared by a particular person – the bridegroom's sister or the bride's mother. Such instances have to be carefully studied, as they indicate that the value of the meat transferred in the transaction may sometimes be derived partly from the labour expended by particular persons who reared the animals.

We have already pointed out that some rudimentary sacrificial notions enter into a hunter's action towards his quarry, but it is only the killing of domestic pigs that can be described as *sacrifice* in the full conventional sense of the term. Williams (1930: 61) applies this term to the slaughter of pigs but provides no analysis of the sacrificial process. Such analysis is not altogether straightforward, as the anthropological study of sacrifice has hitherto remained confined to the application of two models: one derived from Robertson Smith after the analogy of Christian *communion*, and the other derived from Mauss, (1968: 193–307) whose chief inspiration seems to have been the doctrine of *piaculum* among the Brâhmanas (viz. Mauss 1968: 352–4). The wide applicability of Robertson Smith's model has recently been well argued by Stanner (1960–3) and Bellah (1964), while Mauss' model has been enshrined by such brilliant ethnographic applications as Evans-Pritchard's study of *Nuer Religion* (1956).

These two models have a great deal in common, but differ in final destination of the victim and the postulated aim of the sacrifice. As Evans-Pritchard has pointed out (1956: 275), the aim may be to keep the god away or get rid of him (as in Nuer piacular sacrifice), or to establish union or fellowship with him (as in Christian communion, and in Australian *intichiuma*).

Neither model appears to be very appropriate to Orokaiva sacrifice, as it is not clear at all just who the god is to whom the sacrifice is being made. The only divine agency that seems to appear in pig sacrifices, including the major feasts, are spirits, loosely described as belonging to the 'ancestors'. These do not appear to be specific personalised ancestors but seem to be identified with the demigod, or *dema* who instituted the feast, as well as with other *dema* who introduced the various products used at the feast as gifts, ornaments and the like, as well as with clan and lineage ancestors who are responsible for the well-being of the land. A big feast seems to involve the whole pantheon. If this were all, one could classify Orokaiva sacrifice as aiming definitely at communion, as the ritual preceding the feast and during the feast quite clearly has the effect of drawing the divine beings down into the village, and making them enter the persons of the celebrants who behave as though they are possessed by these spirits.

But in addition one must often regard the sacrifices as being made, in a very real sense, to the guests. There are of course pig sacrifices where communion with the god is the only or predominant purpose. For instance, it is customary to sacrifice a pig when new taro fields are prepared for planting and the flesh is shared between the men of the local clan group. Here the purpose is no doubt to bring about an identification of the men with the original ancestor who first

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571 conflict, necessarily precede recourse to sorcery. It is believed, however, that
602 such relatives will not usually carry their resentment too far. As soon as the
518 afflicted person makes his apologies and shows himself ready to make a pig
754 sacrifice, such sorcery will normally case. The same applies to the father's sister, though she has to be watched more carefully than the others, as she is very quick to resent neglect and seek retribution. She will be restrained, however, by the deep love she is expected to bear for her brother, so that she may be expected to agree fairly easily to a settlement. It is thought that mother's sisters are more dangerous as their bonds of family loyalty are much weaker. All these relatives
[431] may cause disease, failure of gardens, bad luck in hunting, etc. All the relationships give rise to the same type of positive and negative reciprocity cycles: if proper prestations are made from time to time, positive reciprocity is maintained, but neglect over a long period will create anger and a negative reciprocity cycle.[5]

In the case of certain close relationships, restraint in acts of negative reciprocity does not arise from any rules limiting the expression of anger, but rather from the existence of other close social relationships which would be threatened if the expression of anger went too far. Thus a mother's brother would be restrained in wreaking revenge upon his nephew by the risk of offending his sister if the revenge were excessive. It is hard to illustrate these principles of exchange with concrete evidence, as I do not know of any actual harm being done between relatives. I know only that misfortunes which I would ascribe to natural causes tend to be explained by sorcery on the part of a neglected relative, and that the neglected relative then asks for or receives a pig or other animal.

671 Prestations between affines have a similar explanation, though the pattern of
578 hostile action and retaliation between affines is somewhat different. The first
602 hostile action in the series tends to be the abduction of a woman for purposes of
583 marriage. This is defined as a hostile act directed against the woman's kin group. The girl's parents look for her and show considerable fury when they find her, wreaking havoc in the village of the abductor. One may say that this is the first cycle of exchange in an affinal relationship and it is totally negative. The abductor's kin group offers a present of ornaments called *sovu hambo*, and promises a bridewealth of acceptable proportions in return for which the bride's parents depart in peace.

It should be noted that, though this second cycle contains an exchange of positive (rather than negative) objects of mediation, the bridegroom's people remain in the position of debtors, while the bride's parents continue to harbour their anger. All they have agreed to is the continued residence of the bride with the bridegroom's people, pending a satisfactory settlement. The third cycle is constituted by the payment of bridewealth, including pig sacrifices, on one side, and the transfer of the usual conjugal rights, including the right to the bride's offspring, by the bride's kin group. On the level of social exchange, however, there is still no exchange in benefits. The relationship remains one between creditor and debtor, as the bridewealth does not wipe out the anger of the bride's parents nor expiate the offence of abduction. This point will be explained further in the chapter on marriage.

It suffices to say at this stage that pig sacrifices made by the bridegroom and

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his family are a necessary part of the process of assuaging the affinal family's anger. However, such one-sided payments do not in themselves set up a social relationship between affines among the Orokaiva. During this whole first phase of the marriage, the strictest affinal taboos are maintained, prohibiting, for instance, commensality between son-in-law and parents-in-law and their close kin. For social relations to begin, it is necessary for the bride's mother to rear a pig for sacrifice to the bridegroom. Unless she does this the son-in-law feels too 'ashamed' of the humiliations he has been through and of the anger shown to him for social relations to be possible. This sacrifice, too, has therefore an element of expiation. After this sacrifice, the taboos are relaxed and the mother-in-law attends a feast at which she *pretends* to eat. Ruth Craig (1969:189), who describes a similar pattern among the Telefolmin of the New Guinea Highlands, comments cogently: 'The second transaction, the return payment, initiates the affinal relationship and emphasises its chief characteristic, friendly reciprocity . . . The relationship starts as one of equality.' It is thus clear that model 27 provides an explanation not only of inter-village feasts and consanguineal relations, but also of the establishment of affinal relationships. On the social plane pig-sacrifice establishes positive reciprocity, while on the magico-religious plane it generates *ivo* for the participants. Reciprocity and *ivo* are thus homologous notions on different levels of conceptualisation.

REFERENCES

1 Durkheim wrote that a sacrifice is composed of two essential elements: an act of communion and an act of oblation (1961: 384). He distinguished sharply between representative or commemorative rites and piacular rites, according to the prevailing mood. The former are performed in a state of confidence and joy, the latter in a state of sadness, arising out of misfortune, evil omens, sorrow or fear (*ibid.* 434–5). Evans-Pritchard (1956:275) made a somewhat similar distinction, though perhaps a less subjective one, between 'communion' (involving a desire to be close to God) and 'piaculum' (involving a desire to keep God away or get rid of him).

The phenomena described in this work, though aberrant from the viewpoint of the Durkeimian and Evans-Pritchard models, are fairly widespread in Melanesia. For instance, Lane, describing pig sacrifices on South Pentecost, points out (1) that sacrificer and sacrificed pig merge and share identity; (2) that the meaning of the offerings is 'clarified by reference to the way in which a special formal friendship is instituted between two men' (1965: 267). The Mae Enga sacrifice pigs to a ghost when that ghost is suspected of causing misfortunes. But half or more of the meat, sometimes all of it, goes to maternal kinsmen as the ghost is always considered to belong to the uterine line (Meggitt 1965*b*: 112–3). Elements of communion and piaculum are both present, but also a need to influence critical social relationships.

2 For a detailed discussion of myths related to the differentiation of species, see Lévi-Strauss 1964.

3 For details on the effect of the Mount Lamington eruption on the Sangara tribe and the founding and development of Hohorita, see Schwimmer 1969.

4 A fuller discussion on Orokaiva leadership will be found in Reay 1953, Schwimmer 1967.

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431 far has presented this exchange system as a set of individual, though
437 interconnected, networks.
121 If our analysis cannot go beyond the identification and description of these networks, we shall clearly have failed to establish exchange as an explanatory principle for the ethnography of the Orokaiva. The success of our enterprise therefore depends on the discovery of some constraints, existing within the exchange system, which are placed upon individuals in virtue of their membership of some corporate group. If such rules exist at all, one may assume that they are most likely to be found in the marriage system.

583 Here we enter somewhat controversial ground. In the introduction to a
121 symposium on marriage in the New Guinea Highlands, Meggitt has recently (1969) asserted that, in that area at least, positive marriage rules do not exist but only what he calls 'contingent preferential arrangements'. If his arguments are accepted, there would be no positive marriage rules among the Orokaiva nor, as far as I can see, anywhere else in the world. His arguments hinge on his use of the terms 'preferential' and 'prescriptive', but even if we revert to the definitions given for these terms by Lévi-Strauss (1967: xvii–xxiii) a very careful and detailed investigation is required in order to determine whether or not the Orokaiva have any preferential rules of marriage and exogamy.

It may be best to start with Lévi-Strauss' own discussions regarding the problems of Melanesian marriage rules. When he wrote *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* (1949), the ethnographic data from which a general model for the Melanesian area could have been securely constructed were lacking. Nonetheless Lévi-Strauss wrote a brief passage on this subject and ventured a bold hypothesis. The hypothesis seemed especially bold because at that time there was only one ethnography that could be quoted to support it, a description by F. E. Williams of the apparently aberrant kinship system of the Koriari (1932). I think nonetheless that his hypothesis is a most useful starting point for the analysis of Melanesian systems:

> *La Nouvelle-Guinée, et les régions avoisinantes, présentent, à un degré exceptionnel, un phénomène que Williams a decrit sous le nom d' "affiliation sexuelle", c'est-à-dire une différentiation de statut entre le frère et la sœur, l'un suivant la ligne paternelle et l'autre la ligne maternelle. Il est impossible d'interpréter ce phénomène en fonction de l'échange restreint: mais il devient très clair quand on l'envisage sous l'échange généralisé, puisqu'en mariage matrilatéral comme en mariage patrilatéral, le frère et la sœur suivent des destins différents. L'étude des phénomènes d'affiliation sexuelle . . . permet donc de définir, à travers tout le monde mélanésien, une sorte de faille de l'échange généralisé . . . Toute l'aire orientale, "océano-américaine", comme on peut le nommer, forme donc une sorte de théâtre, où se rencontrent échange restreint et échange généralisé, tantôt pour s'opposer, et tantôt pour se combiner* (1949: reprinted 1967: 534–5).

Since 1949, Lévi-Strauss has made several further contributions to the analysis of Melanesian societies. In the second edition of *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* he suggested that *la ligne de partage entre les sociétés traditionellement appelées "primitives" et les sociétés dites "civilisées" ne coincide pas avec celle entre "structures élémentaires" et "structures com-*

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plexes" (1967: 123). In particular, he stated the opinion that many Melanesian structures *'ne relèvent pas des structures élémentaires' (ibid.*: 122). We learn the precise meaning of this statement in another essay, *The Future of Kinship Studies*, published in the English language in 1966. Whereas elementary structures operate ideally within a fixed number of marriage classes, the rules of complex structures are so framed that the system requires a perpetual supply of new affinal groups for its continued operation. They produce a probabilistic alliance network. Rules of this kind are found in the Crow and Omaha systems, but also in many other culture areas, including Melanesia (1966: 21).

Since these hypotheses were published, a number of anthropologists have begun to test them empirically. To mention only two examples, Guiart (1968) has shown the presence of restricted exchange rules in New Caledonia and Kelly (1968) has shown the presence of generalised exchange on Dobu. It seems, however, that a crucial implication of the Lévi-Straussian hypotheses remains to be explored. It is suggested that restricted and generalised exchange (or perhaps restricted and complex exchange) *encounter* one another in the Melanesian culture area. This would imply the possibility of the simultaneous existence in the same society of both forms and some interaction between the two. If such a society could be found, the hypothesis implies that generalised exchange attempts to establish itself there, but *fails* to find a firm foothold, while features of restricted exchange tend to reassert themselves constantly as a result of this *failure*.

The interest of the Orokaiva case lies in the coexistence of the two systems, on the level both of norms and facts. In Orokaiva social structure we may see the two systems in interaction and discover by which factors each of the systems is maintained in opposition to the other. We thus arrive at a model on a higher level of abstraction than those of Guiart and Kelly, but comprising them both. In this model moiety systems are perpetually broken up by forces built into the structure itself: yet the model also predicts their perpetual reinstatement. The model consists, in fact, of a cyclical movement between the two patterns. The reality of Melanesian structure is not exhausted by either of the two patterns taken in isolation, but includes their necessary alternation over time and in space. The dynamic whereby this alternation is produced is the main subject of this chapter.

2. *Patrilineal Groups*

The Orokaiva are patrilocal and have dispersed patriclans. They make many statements which demonstrate their patrilineal ideology: agnates are expected to support each other in war and all other vicissitudes of life, irrespective of their place of residence. The basic inheritance rule is patrilineal. Clans and clan segments have distinctive emblems which are passed on in the patriline and identified with a common agnatic ancestor. One may even hear claims that the dispersed clan is an exogamous unit. All analytically-minded investigators, however, have been aware that this agnatic ideology covered up a very different reality. Williams remarked: 'The Orokaiva organisation very nearly approaches a bilateral system, though in theory it is patrilineal' (1925: 407). Williams was especially struck by the 'laxity' of the marriage regulations and by cases where

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Rimoldi. I witnessed marriage and mortuary payments where an entire *hae* (including non-consanguines) were present, but where clansmen of different *hae* had no business to be present. 614 824

Orokaiva genealogies hardly ever extended further than two generations beyond the oldest living member of a family. Thus, I was able to draw up a sizeable list of people who lived in Sivepe and other villages around 1915, but could get no genealogical information showing how these people were related to one another. However, informants were able to tell me the *hae* of these ancestors, and these *hae* proved to be the only evidence for statements that A and B 'must have been closely related' or 'cannot have been closely related'. In contrast to the clan and clan segment (which I shall later show to be military and political units – whole or fragmentary), the plant emblem group alone has the nature of a true kinship group. Therefore we should not be surprised that the *hae* occurs prominently in the Orokaiva marriage rules with regard to incest and exogamy.

3. *Williams' Theory of Orokaiva Marriage*

Being a most careful ethnographer, Williams frankly admitted he was unable to understand the Orokaiva rules of exogamy. He quotes three conflicting sets of rules, given to him by informants, and was unable to discern any clear system. According to some informants the clan was the exogamous group. According to others, marriage within the clan was sometimes permissible, but marriage was prohibited between persons sharing a plant emblem. A third rule quoted to Williams was that marriage was prohibited between *du* (i.e. real and classificatory siblings) but permitted and common between cross-cousins. One task of the present essay is to resolve these contradictions. 582 [121]

Williams, furthermore, confessed himself unable to find any positive marriage regulations, i.e. 'any prescribed classes into which a man is obliged to marry' (1930:132). Here he was being too modest: in a subsequent discussion of 'the four forms of marriage' of the Orokaiva, he actually provided the key to the system, though he was unable to carry its analysis as far as he managed to do in some of his later ethnographies, such as those of the Koiari and the *Papuans of the Trans-Fly*. 582 583

The 'four forms' were: purchase, exchange, elopement, and capture. Marriage by capture used to be very frequent and a regular aftermath of cannibal raids. Williams reports that, under this form of marriage, relations between affines often remained hostile – which is not surprising. In many cases the hostile groups later established peace or at least a truce. One feature of such a truce used to be the payment of bridewealth for captured women. The truce was often negotiated at least partly through the influence of the captive. Though Williams has little information on the compensation paid one gathers that the usual pattern of Orokaiva bridewealth payments was followed: pigs, valuables, bark-cloth, pots, taro, etc. My own data confirm that it was not uncommon for ordinary affinal relations to be established once the captors had paid bridewealth. Children of the marriage would then set up the customary relationship with their mother's brother and even receive permanent rights in hunting lands and the like. 583 602 578

Elopement marriage likewise used to be very frequent. Williams reports that it

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583 602 578 led to serious quarrels, especially if the girl had been kept by her parents or brother for an exchange marriage. Usually, these quarrels were settled in due course upon payment of a suitable bridewealth and sometimes by a subsequent marriage for which the abductor's family provided the bride. Williams comments:

> The remarkable gestures of hostility against the husband's people which sometimes characterise Orokaiva marriage, i.e. the attempted dragging away of the bride by her people, the humiliation of the bridegroom, the damaging of his village and the bellicose demonstrations at the taking over of the *dorobu* (= bridewealth), all properly belong to the irregular methods of capture and elopement; they are the aftermath, the retaliation (1930:149).

583 584 The third and fourth marriage forms distinguished by Williams are purchase (i.e. obtaining a wife in exchange for *dorobu*) and exchange (*mine*, i.e. an arrangement whereby two men each make a true or classificatory sister available to the other). It seems that Williams did not differentiate clearly between modes of obtaining a wife and modes of making a valid marriage contract. One might obtain a wife in a number of ways. Certainly, capture and abduction seem to have been the most frequent at one time, but there were also child betrothals; long-standing preferential arrangements between villages; romances leading to sister exchange and marriages to seal political alliances. There was the whole gamut between choices made by lovers without parental approval and choices (probably relatively less frequent) made by parental fiat. But there were only two ways of making a valid marriage contract, namely *dorobu* and *mine*. Williams himself comes very close to this view towards the end of his chapter on 'Marriage' (1930: Ch. IX). He also maintains, no doubt correctly, that in Orokaiva thought *mine* appears as the 'ideal', i.e. preferential, mode of contracting a marriage:

> It appears that marriage by exchange is preferable to marriage by purchase – at least in the eyes of the marriageable man, and probably also in the eyes of his elders who sympathise with his desires. We may perhaps go so far as to say that the actual buying of a wife only takes place when circumstances make present or future exchange impossible (1930: 149).

This seems to place Williams' theory firmly on the side of Guiart's theory of marriage in New Caledonia: exchange marriage becomes the preferential mode, the 'model', whereas marriage 'by purchase' is demoted to the status of an ecologically caused departure from the 'model'. In this chapter I shall argue that Williams' Orokaiva theory reifies the folk model and conceals some of the complexity of Orokaiva social structure.

4. *Elements of Restricted Exchange*

582 583 Marriage rules related to the principle of restricted exchange are actually more numerous than Williams supposed. They must be briefly reviewed before we can argue cogently that the principle of restricted exchange does not suffice to account for the rules governing the total Orokaiva marriage system. Williams was entirely right in supposing that the Orokaiva have preferential sister exchange

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marriage, even though actual cases recorded in the three village investigated are only 5 per cent of the total for true siblings and the proportion is declining. Sister exchange marriages were considered best because relations between affines were apt to be the most harmonious and also because no bride price was necessary. As any trouble that occurs in family life is apt to be ascribed to sorcery by affines, it was thought that families founded on sister exchange marriage would be the most likely to prosper in respect of health, stability and economic success.

Furthermore, there is an explicit rule of preferential bilateral cross-cousin marriage. All informants were agreed that the most proper marriage partner is one who is addressed as *simbo* before marriage; Williams defines *simbo* as 'child of the father's sister; children of all *tata*; child of the mother's brother; children of all *nobo*, i.e. cross-cousins' (1930: 109). Out of twenty-two married couples resident in Sivepe, fourteen actually called each other *simbo* before marriage. Williams notes that *simbo* marriages were extremely common in the communities he studies (1930:132), but does not seem to have been told of the preferential rule.

The existence of such a rule can be inferred not only from direct statements, but also from investigation of the primary meaning of the term *simbo* itself. The primary meaning is not cross-cousin and we shall later see that the two terms do not entirely share the same field of reference. *Simbo* is an arrangement of marriage. A *simbo* may be established when a boy's parents bring part of a bridewealth to the parents of a girl they want their son to marry. If the arrangement is acceptable, the parents help in the garden of their son's future affines and continue to send food. Such an arrangement is usually made immediately after the rituals following the girl's first menstruation. If the *simbo* is broken, the girl's parents must pay back the gifts. In a secondary sense, the word *simbo* also refers to that category of consanguines with which betrothals of the kind just described can be properly made. All members of that category are either cross-cousins in the strict sense, or consanguines with whom kinship can be traced neither wholly in the patriline, nor wholly in the matriline.

There are also rules establishing preferential marriage between specific villages. Though Williams did not notice the presence of this rule among the Orokaiva, he described a very similar rule obtaining among the Kotari, where he spoke of 'reciprocating pairs of groups' (1932). Under this arrangement, two local clan groups or exogamous lineages give wives to each other from generation to generation, each side supplying as near as possible an equal number. A group that has received a wife is expected to send one back in the same or the next generation. If the return prestation occurs in the same generation one may speak of sister exchange; if it occurs in the next generation, the rule is expressed by the Orokaiva as *eta data jimbari*, i.e. marrying in the mother's village.

This rule applies especially to girls who are expecting to go to the village from which their mother has been taken, thus balancing accounts between reciprocating pairs of groups. Such a rule cannot properly be described as a prescription for patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, as there is at the same time a preference for sister exchange, so that the total pattern of marriages between reciprocating pairs of groups is ideally (and in fact commonly) bilateral. I found that 35 per cent of Orokaiva marriages now in force were contracted in accordance with the rule of *eta data jimbari*, for a period not less than two generations.

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583 528 616 Forms of dual organisation between pairs of reciprocating groups have always been of limited scope as the groups tended to reside apart from each other, and each group tended to have marriage exchange relations with several other groups at the same time. Even the short genealogies of Sivepe show evidence that the families of this village have been participating in no less than twenty-five reciprocating pairs of groups, the exchange sometimes consisting of no more [177] than one recorded exchange of women between two villages. Interestingly enough, it was Australian pressure towards village consolidation that emphasised [361] the tendency to dual organisation.

361 178 614 583 First of all, co-residence tends to increase the number of marriages between local clan groups which are thus thrown together. Usually, such local clan groups are already reciprocating pairs, but when co-residence is established, they begin to reciprocate at a greater rate. For instance, the Seho and Jegase local clan groups in Sivepe, comprising together sixteen households, are linked by seven current Seho-Jegase marriages. This was sufficient to define the seven Seho households and the nine Jegase households as standing in an affinal relation to one another.

614 621 166 616 In such a village the other households tend to be classified as adhering to one of the two dominant local clan groups. A few years before I came to Sivepe, Rimoldi and Waddel had both visited the village and recorded the presence of a third local clan group, called Timumu. On my arrival I found that this group, consisting of three households, had adopted the Jegase clan name, thus establishing a tidy dualist pattern between one group defined as agnates and a second group defined as affines. A few months before I settled in Sivepe, six households migrated there from Garombi. All the men were members of the Sorovi clan, though of different lineages. A year after they migrated, five of the householders were classified as part of the Jegase clan (by the use of sibling terms of address) while the sixth was classified as part of the Seho clan.

621 614 616 I found a similar pattern in eleven other multi-clan villages I visited. When I first inquired, I was mostly told that they were two-clan villages, the names of the clans being given in each case. Two of the villages were said to have four clans, two pairs of two. Whenever I sought detailed data, I found male householders belonging to additional clans. In Hohorita I was told that the front half was inhabited by two clans, and the back half by two further clans. In fact twelve clans were represented; when this came to light, my informants explained to me that the clan names I had been given at first were those of the 'main' clans. There seemed to be a strong ideological notion that a multi-clan village (or [582] village section) should consist of two local clan groups. Furthermore, this arrangement affects the marriage rules: once Timumu became joined with Jegase under the same clan name, marriages between the two fused local clan, groups became prohibited.

5. *Complementary Opposition in Village Topography*

If the reduction of multi-clan to two-clan villages had occurred only in Sivepe and a few other villages, it could easily be explained solely by processes of clan fusion which are prevalent throughout the area and which will be discussed further below. But I found it to be a regular feature of the

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consolidated Orokaiva villages I visited. Yet historical evidence of earlier settlements precludes the supposition that co-residence of reciprocating marriage groups was ever a regular practice or a preferential rule. Such co-residence can be explained only by Australian pressure towards village consolidation. Far from being congenial to the Orokavia, it may better be regarded as a major potential cause of strain. When the Australian administration planned to intensify this consolidation policy after the Mount Lamington eruption in 1951, Belshaw rightly warned the authorities in a published paper (1951) that the enforced co-residence of affines would create serious social strains which might impede the administration's social development objectives. The Orokaiva response to these social strains appears to have been to restructure the multi-clan villages and give them an organisational form they are more easily able to handle. Under this arrangement agnates, uterine kin and affines live together in the same village but are sorted into two groups of real or fictional agnates. These two groups have affinal relations with one another and stand in complementary opposition in social and political affairs.

In some villages this complementary opposition is further expressed in the position of the two groups in village topography. Nearly all Orokaiva villages are built in two facing rows separated by a fairly wide grassed area known as the *araha*. For cosmological reasons that do not concern us here, these rows tend to run in the direction of the top of Mount Lamington – from downhill (*veari*) to uphill (*avunu*). The two rows are known as *mende* or *bende*, a word which may mean 'nose' or 'hillock' or 'side of a village'. The two sides are designated as *ihane* and *sose*, *ihane* being to the right of a person facing the mountain, *sose* on the left. In 1965, when Sivepe was rebuilt on a new site, all Seho men built their houses on the *ihane* side while all Jegase men built on the *sose* side.

Outwardly, the topography of this new Sivepe does not differ significantly from the earliest descriptions we have of Orokaiva villages in the early post-contact period. These villages also had two sides. They had the same short connecting lines of houses at the *avunu* and *veari* ends of the village. Williams reports that these connecting lines prevent spirits from coming into the *araha*. The only differences are in size and in the style of the houses. The basic innovation in New Sivepe lies in the arrangement of social groups on the village site. Real or assumed agnatic links now exist between all the householders on each side, whereas affinal relations exist between all the householders of one side and the other. The door openings of the affines face each other, but they are separated by the wide field of the *araha*. When people sit down to smoke and chew betelnut in front of their houses, there is easy movement between residents who live on the same side. They frequently visit each other's fires without any ceremony. But one does not cross the *araha* to sit on the other side without a serious purpose. One watches what happens on the other side; one does not always hear it. There is frequent and friendly contact between the sides but it is clear to the observer that the physical distance between them symbolises an equally real social distance.

This residential arrangement between affines is not traditional. If affines happened to live in a traditional hamlet there were no formal patterns for keeping them at a physical distance. When multi-clan villages were first established, households of the various clans were placed next to each other in a

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

Fig. 9. Village layout of new Sivepe.

361 rather irregular pattern. Village plans of Sivepe drawn by Rimoldi and Waddell in
616 1963 and 1964 show no formal separation between the clans. Some neighbour-
614 ing villages, such as Garombi, however, did allocate one side to each of their two
621 clans. The fact that Sivepe introduced this pattern in 1965 has no particular explanation except that it appealed to the Seho clan leader who supplied the land for the village site. One might describe his innovation as an idiosyncrasy or a fashion but at the same time it is significant that the pattern of residence he introduced resembles that familiar to anthropologists in many parts of the world where exogamous moieties are found.

583 I have now shown most of the evidence for direct marriage exchange and
616 forms of dual organisation. The question that remains to be answered is why this
121 system was so fitfully practised. Are the discrepant cases to be explained merely by organisational factors such as lack of choice, the vicissitudes of war, the need for alliances? Or are there present in the culture a further set of rules related to marriage which we have not yet considered and which are irreconcilable with the principle of direct marriage exchange?

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It is obvious, first of all, that the Orokaiva rules concerning bilateral cross-cousin marriage and reciprocating pairs of groups are not free from ambiguity. The term *simbo* is not synonymous with the term 'cross-cousin'. Not all societies which have reciprocating pairs of groups have direct marriage exchange, as Lévi-Strauss showed in respect of the Koiari. The fact that the Sivepe people were partners in no less than twenty-five reciprocating pairs of groups in two generations poses the question whether this apparent instability corresponds to a structural regularity such as the 'sex affiliation' of the Koiari. Furthermore, in view of Lévi-Strauss' analysis of the African *lobola*, we need to investigate whether the Orokaiva institution of bridewealth (*dorobu*) is consistent with the principle of direct marriage exchange. Such inquiries would not serve to deny the reality of this principle in Orokaiva culture but rather to raise the possibility of the combined presence of direct and generalised exchange.

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6. *Kinship Terminology*

Though Williams' description of Orokaiva kinship terminology is generally very accurate, it is deficient in two respects: his definition of the term *simbo* (quoted in section 4 above) is inconsistent with Orokaiva usage and he gives no terms for female speakers. Yet it is in these two areas that we find the key to Orokaiva marriage. We have seen that a *simbo* is – always and exclusively – a marriageable consanguine. If Williams were right in saying that a *simbo* is also – always and exclusively – a cross-cousin, then a rule of bilateral *simbo* marriage would be unambiguously equivalent to a rule of bilateral cross-cousin marriage. If the term *simbo* could be positively defined as a bilateral category of cross-cousins (as the Aranda do), then again we would have a rule of bilateral cross-cousin marriage. In the absence of a positive rule, however, the Orokaiva kinship system could not be regarded as 'elementary' in Lévi-Strauss' sense of the term, and thus it would not contain a true rule of bilateral cross-cousin marriage.

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Again where such a rule prevails consistently, there would seem to be no need of special affinal terms. Williams, entirely correctly, gives a set of distinct affinal terms for male speakers which would suggest that the whole system is based on generalised rather than restricted exchange. Williams' explanation of this apparent discrepancy appears to be an evolutionary one: *dorobu* came first (and established the terminology) while *mine* developed later. As we shall see, the reality is more complex, as the Orokaiva use two types of affinal terminology: one type which is consistent with generalised exchange and another which is consistent with direct exchange. The former of these two types of terminology is in regular use by men and the latter by women. This fact is consistent with the theory that the Orokaiva marriage system is a combination of generalised and restricted exchange.

For the purpose of a componential analysis of terms we shall consider only terms used in face-to-face interaction by *ego* to address an *alter* when no other relative is present. The following dimensions of contrast apply:

Consanguine(C): *Ego* traces relationship to *alter* through a chain of linkages based on filiation, or a shared clan name, or common birth in a distant village.

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Affine (A): Spouses of consanguines of own and junior generation; co-eval and senior consanguines of those spouses. 601
Generational Removal: G–O: Same generation as *ego*. G1: One generation removed. G2: Two or more generations removed.
Sex of alter: M: Male; F: Female.
Sex of ego: Em: Male *ego* Ef: Female *ego*
Relative sex of ego and alter: SS: Same sex. OS: opposite sex.
Relative sex in consanguineal linkages; //: Relationship is either wholly agnatic or wholly uterine. X: relationship is neither wholly agnatic nor wholly uterine. It passes through at least one opposite-sex linkage.
Marriageability (same generation only): Ma: Relationship belongs to marriageable category. NMa: Relationship belongs to non-marriageable category.
Relative age of alter: Sr: Older. Yr: Younger.

Using this code, we may define in the following way the kinship terms used in addressing consanguines. The bracketed terms are in the dialects from which Williams' information is drawn.[1]

epe:	M	Sr	G2	C			(Williams: *ahije*)
	M	Sr	G1	X	C		(Williams: *nobo*)
jape:	F	Sr	G2	C			(Williams: *ahije*)
mama:	M	Sr	G1	//	C		
aja:	F	Sr	G1	//	C		
tata:	F	Sr	G1	X	C		
apa:	SS	Sr	G–O	//	C		(Williams: *bitepemi*)
	SS	Sr	G–O	X	NMa	C	(Williams: *simbo*)
eambo:	SS	Jr	G–O	//	C		(Williams: *biteambo*)
	SS	Jr	G–O	X	NMa	C	(Williams: *simbo*)
du:	OS	G–O	//	C			
	OS	G–O	X	NMa	C		
simbo:	G–O	X	Ma	C			
meni:	M	Jr	G1	//	C		(Williams: *mei*)
iai;	F	Jr	G1	//	C		
ahije:	Jr	G1	X	C			
	Jr	G2	C				

This componential analysis, prepared from Orokaiva ideological statements, contains all the ambiguities characteristic of the system itself. Different local clan groups are supposed to use sibling terms in addressing each other. But this is above all a strategic device to emphasise the obligation of mutual political and military support. Extension of the exogamy rule to distant clansmen would logically follow from their classification as siblings, but serve no useful purpose. On the contrary, if local clan groups live at some distance from one another, the bonds between them will wear rather thin unless intermarriage between them actually does occur. In practice, distant local clan groups are not infrequently used as partners in reciprocating pairs of groups. They are then regarded as not 'really' agnates, and terms of address such as *simbo epe, tata* are used. Once intermarriage has been instituted such terms are regularly transmitted from one generation to the next. 583 614 601

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by a consanguine of either side, the proper side being determined by a medicine man (See Schwimmer 1969). The effect of this theory is that a woman belongs to her clan in a less absolute sense than a man.

This theory of paternity may be explained teleologically as serving to emphasise the rights and identity of the patrician in a social system which 'very nearly approaches' bilaterality. In Orokaiva society women very often receive a portion of patrimony land. Their indulgent brothers frequently give lands to their sister's children and such land may well pass into the hands of those children's heirs. Currently, over 50 per cent of cultivated land is owned by persons other than the cultivators, and very often the cultivator's useholds became perpetuated. Such perpetuation proceeds in spite of an explicit rule denying women hereditary rights to their patrimony useholds. The physiological reasoning by which Orokaiva women are denied full clan membership should therefore be interpreted as a symbolic statement insisting on the limits that should be placed upon uterine intrusion on clan property.

When Orokaiva informants are asked why women should not have hereditary rights over land, they usually give as the reason that a woman will marry into a strange clan and village so that it would be dangerous to give her children any rights. Such reasoning goes back to a time when the most frequent marriage forms were abduction and elopement. In practice, the fate of a woman's patrimony rights depends on where she marries: if she does marry in a friendly neighbouring village or by sister exchange, her children will probably keep her property. This is therefore the preferred feminine pattern. But if she is taken by a man from a strange village, her clan rights become precarious. We have already seen that this latter pattern of marriage is forced upon men not only by ecological contingencies but by the marriage rules themselves. Ideological devices to deny women full clan membership are consistent with this pattern. Such devices are inconsistent with restricted marriage exchange, because the latter system depends on the return of a woman's offspring to her natal clan as marriage partners in a later generation. In the Orokaiva system this is envisaged as only one of several structurally recognised possibilities.

8. *The Nature of Orokaiva Bridewealth*

The most convenient way of explaining the nature of Orokaiva bridewealth payments (*dorobu*) is by contrasting them with certain types of African bridewealth (*lobola*), as analysed by Lévi-Strauss.[2] Here the recipient applies the gifts, wholly or in large part, to the immediate purchase of wives for himself or his family. *Lobola 'n'est recu que pour commencer, aussitôt, un nouveau circuit . . . Il ne sera jamais consommé, sauf, occasionellement et partiellement, à des fins sacrificielles. A peine reçu, il fera l'objet d'un remploi, sous la forme d'une épouse pour le frère ou le cousin de la jeune marié* (1967:536). Under such a system it could rightly be said that *'la femme fournie en contrepartie est remplacée par une valeur symbolique'* and that the wife-giving families received in return *'la garantie, sous forme de biens privilégiés, de trouver elles-mêmes des épouses'* (*ibid.* 540).

Papuan bridewealth objects, however, cannot generally be applied to the same ends, or are not in practice generally so applied. The most important Orokaiva

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583 *dorobu* items are: pigs, taro, pots, bark cloth, feathers and bone and shell ornaments. To this we may add, for modern marriages, money. The pigs are sacrificed and not used for breeding. The pots and bark cloths are kept by the bride or distributed in her family but are not, as a rule, applied towards a future *dorobu*. Feathers and ornaments are kept by the various recipients who use them, may give them away or trade them at their convenience, but there is no fixed practice of applying them especially for *dorobu*. There is no circuit in which wives move in one direction, and *dorobu* in the opposite direction. When a *dorobu* marriage is afoot the prospective bridegroom, the members of his paternal and maternal *hae* and, to a minor extent, other members of his clan, will amass the goods that are necessary. Pigs are specially bred, taro may be specially grown. Birds are hunted for feathers. Trade goods are assembled for the acquisition of ornaments. In modern times, the prospective bridegroom seeks employment to obtain money. If the bride's brother happens to be collecting bridewealth at the time of the wedding, his own task may be facilitated, but he is still expected to show his prowess by going through the same operations as his brother-in-law.

583 606 The difference between African and Papuan practice is basically that *lobola* cattle are preserved whereas *dorobu* pigs are sacrificed. Though we are right in supposing *dorobu* to be a set of gift exchange objects, it would be misleading to say that *dorobu* is exchanged for a woman. I have collected detailed information (as yet unpublished) about the symbolic meaning of the transfer of the objects included in *dorobu*. This formation is inconsistent with the theory that these objects are regarded as equivalent to a bride. Also, the especially aggressive behaviour of the bride's parents towards their new *imi* is hard to explain on the assumption that *dorobu* is in any way a symbolic equivalent of the bride.

The main recurrent theme of all informant's statements about *dorobu* marriage is the anger of the bride's parents. This anger is more than a mere psychological state: it is a basic part of the institution. The degree of anger may vary from one case to the next according to the amount of animosity that is felt towards the *imi's* village, family and person. If there is any hint of a breach of the exogamy rules it will be very great; if the *imi's* local clan group has a claim on a wife from the bride's village, the anger may be much less. But some degree of anger is expected in any *dorobu* marriage.

Dorobu is fundamentally a payment for anger.[3] When my interpreter wished to marry a classificatory *mosida* her father, after first refusing outright, finally set a brideprice at a rate more than four times as high as had ever been paid in the village. This was out of the question and my interpreter left the village soon afterwards. People told me this price showed the measure of the man's anger. A similar line of explanation was followed when I asked informants the meaning of the strict rules of avoidance practised towards affines. I asked: 'Why do you behave in this way? Don't you like your *imbohi*?' The reply was: 'I love her very much because it was she who gave me my wife. But I feel ashamed because I shall never be able to repay her.'

431 583 It is possible, from the evidence of rites and myths, to reconstruct the significance of the various gifts that compose *dorobu*. Summarising the results of such a reconstruction, I suggest that the gifts of taro and pig both re-enact a sacrifice in primal time where a man, identified respectively with taro and pig, is

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killed and eaten and is remembered as the demigod who made these gifts to mankind. When such gifts are made today it would seem that the donor is symbolically sacrificing himself to the recipients. The custom of giving clothes and cooking pots goes back to a myth where a woman is described as living alone and naked and without fire, so that she had to prepare her food by letting the sun burn it. Two men came, gave her a skirt, brought her fire and thus acted as her deliverers. These gifts, far from being 'equivalent' to a woman, are male gifts *for* a woman, and emphasise the blessings of the cultural institution of marriage. On the significance of ornaments as part of a wedding gift I am less certain, but the evidence suggests that they are pledges. They are objects of great magical power, the mere possession of which is thought to demonstrate that their owner adheres to moral principles. The gift of such objects to another party demonstrates that the donor possesses such moral objects, pledges that he will show propriety in his behaviour towards the recipient and enjoins the recipient to do the same for him.

In combination, the *dorobu* gifts convey a clear and appropriate message: the wife-taker acknowledges his indebtedness, emphasises that by taking a woman in marriage he conveys a great blessing upon her and makes pledges which ideally are binding on both parties. Acceptance of these gifts need imply no more than that the wife-givers acquiesce in the *status quo* (which has been established by abduction or elopement). Until the affines make counter gifts, *dorobu* does not even establish social relations between the two sides. This does not happen until the bridegroom's sister has bred and given a pig to him and until the bride's mother has bred and given a pig to her son-in-law. It is only then that a limited commensality between the two sides is established: they have a meal together at which the *imbohi* pretends to eat.

The continuing avoidances and dangers characteristic of Orokaiva affinal relations are all of a kind very familiar in other parts of the world, but the less usual feature is that joking relations, coldness and deliberate social distance can be terminated by the cancellation of the debt through exchange marriage. The strife of 'ordinary' affinal relations is seen as part of a longer cycle which stretches from the sister exchange marriage established as ideal by the ancestors to exchange marriages that remain present as a constant possibility.

9. *Application of the Model to Clan Formation*

The model of marriage exchange as presented here envisages the permanent cyclical recurrence, in the history of any given social group, of restricted and generalised exchange, or – as one might say – of a state of matrimonial amity and strife, unity and division. This model is given additional credibility if we consider some Orokaiva theories about social relations and if we consider the processes of clan formation.

On social philosophy only a very brief reference is appropriate here. The Orokaiva believe that due to actions of their primal ancestors, men are in permanent strife with one another and for that reason dwell apart in separate villages. They express this belief quite explicitly when explaining some of their own myths. I have described above (Chapter III) an Orokaiva myth on the origin

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of feasts, explaining why there is a rule that feasts may be held only when it is ritually established that food will be plentiful.

Discussion of this myth made it clear that the feast is regarded as a purely temporary interruption of the state of strife, but that it can restore a temporary harmony if ritual is properly observed. The feast-givers must have an abundance of food; they must give everything they have to their guests. Their ancestors will then bless them; their enemies will remove evil spells from their lands, and their gardens will greatly prosper afterwards.

At a feast the Orokaiva became ritually and spiritually identified with their primal ancestors and re-enact the peace and harmony that existed in original time before strife began. It was, however, the traditional belief that such a state could not be expected to last; that after the feast strife would re-assert itself. The myth instructed man to hold feasts 'from time to time', the interval between one feast and another being characterised by food shortage and warfare. Peace was not considered to be a possible permanent state, though my informants remarked that since the coming of the white man it had become so.

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We find a similar cyclical pattern in the marriage practices of social groups. Let us take as the commencement of the cycle a crisis such as a military defeat or serious quarrel which leads a fragment of a social group to separate, move some distance away and establish a new settlement. Such a group will usually begin to intermarry with new groups using devices such as abduction and elopement. Gradually, they will set up a number of reciprocal arrangements with groups in the vicinity.. When relations with reciprocating groups become very close, the time will come, usually after two or three generations, when marriages between these groups become impossible under the rules. At this point the former affines have all been turned into notional consanguines. Unless the two sides quarrel (which is not infrequent), the stage is now set for clan fusion.

It could be demonstrated, from a detailed analysis of Sivepe marriages, that the composition of both the Seho and the Jegase local clan groups may be explained by this process. Three of the four 'lineages' of which the Jegase group is composed have migrated to Sivepe since the beginning of the century. One of the waves of migrants already bore the clan name Jegase when they lived at Kiorota, their village of origin. The other two groups assumed it quite recently, after more than two generations of residence and intermarriage. Seho was welded together a good deal earlier than Jegase, so that the lineages are no longer commonly distinguished by name, and the ideology of common agnatic origin is far more firmly established. Seho must, however, have had four lineages at one time and I was able to establish the village of origin of three of them, as well as numerous intermarriages with the Seho of Sivepe after arrival. Intermarriage seems to have become more difficult between these Seho lineages about fifty years ago, and fusion must have been complete by 1925. A marriage between two Seho lineages arranged around 1935 was the last, and caused much annoyance though there was no common *hae*.

I am not suggesting that the process described here explains all Orokaiva clan fusions, but only that the marriage system does in fact turn groups of affines into consanguines and that these consanguines if they live close together tend to assume a common clan name. The importance of this process for the study of kinship structure lies in the fact that it is explicable neither by rules of restricted

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exchange alone, nor by rules of complex generalised exchange alone. If the Orokaiva had only restricted exchange, they would not be periodically forced to look for new groups with whom to intermarry. If the Orokaiva had only complex exchange (as Meggitt seems to believe is the case for all people of the New Guinea Highlands, viz. the Introduction to Glasse and Meggitt, 1969), then there would be no explanation for the various forms of preferential marriage that are still practised and the tendency to establish forms of dual organisation.

From one viewpoint we may say that the Orokaiva system is '*une sorte de faille de l'échange restreint*', because the Orokaiva are forever trying to re-establish such a system. From another viewpoint it is true that, having entered into new alliances and thus moved in the direction of a system of generalised exchange, they always attempt as soon as possible to convert the new alliance into a moiety system. The fear of setting up alliances with new groups is still very strong today, in spite of wide experience with travel among foreign tribes when men take up wage employment outside their own district. They still marry wives preferably from their own village, or one of the villages with which reciprocal arrangements exist. There was not a single current Sivepe marriage that fell outside this pattern.

It is certainly curious that the chief effect of white contact upon the marriage system was to emphasise the tendency to the formation of moieties through enforced village consolidation. One would have expected that greater physical security, greater mobility and the contacts brought about through labour migration would have widened rather than narrowed the men's matrimonial universe. One imagines that processes of social and economic development must ultimately make an ideology of restricted exchange obsolete. Meanwhile, however, we observe mainly a movement in the opposite direction. Not only has government pressure unintentionally increased the opportunities for village endogamy, and moiety formation, but the combined teaching of government and mission has deprecated elopement marriages, and penalised the showing of hostility between affines. The war expeditions which led indirectly to so many marriages were stopped. The concern with pacification on the part of the authorities led to an even greater preference than previously for 'safe' marriages and therefore a narrowing of the marriage universe. My records show more marriages with partners from distant villages prior to 1915 than can be found over the last generation. It is therefore complex generalised rather than restricted exchange that was (unintentionally) discouraged.

10 *Conclusions*

This examination of the Orokaiva marriage system indicates that membership in corporate groups (the *hae*, the local clan group and the village) all have a significant influence on marriage choice, not only negatively, by prohibiting certain partners under a rule of exogamy, but also positively, by pursuing from time to time the establishment of forms of dual organisation. Certainly every individual is more or less free to choose between the two existing systems – direct exchange and complex generalised exchange. There is, however, a constant feature on the level of group relationships, namely the existence of reciprocating pairs of groups. Another constant feature is the temporary nature of these

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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582 614 583 reciprocal relationships which must collapse, due to the operation of the rules, after a few generations. This collapse may either take the form of a separation between the two groups or of a fusion into one local clan group. I have shown that the genesis of many Orokaiva local clan groups may be found in this process.

602 583 614 In the terms used in previous chapters one may categorise sister exchange and the women exchanges in reciprocating pairs of groups as phases of cycles of positive reciprocity. On the other hand, marriage by capture and elopement is a phase of a cycle of negative reciprocity. The long series of prestations offered by the bridegroom and the humiliations suffered by him have the effect of shifting the social relationship with the affinal group into a cycle of positive reciprocity. We therefore do not need to suppose that the bride is regarded as symbolically equivalent to *dorobu* as some African analogies might suggest. *Dorobu* is sufficiently explained as a magical device whereby a reversal in the mode of reciprocity (from negative to positive) is effected. The full range of gifts symbolises the wide scope of the resulting social relationship.

The theory assumes a profound dependence upon the affinal group. This dependence is in fact emphasised in many social, economic, political and religious situations. Ideally, an affinal relationship leads to the establishment of a pair of reciprocating groups. In the light of this understanding, it becomes clear that the exchanges analysed in the preceding chapters are consequences of the group relations set up by the marriage system. In chapter V, I showed the prevalence of a principle of dual allegiance resulting from the inheritance of land originally belonging to the mother's brother. I showed that a critical situation arises in the third generation when the uterine family does not renounce its residual rights but the social relations which give reality to these residual rights, viz. dual allegiance, becomes problematical.

583 614 The system would appear, indeed, to be so automatically productive of crises that one might wonder how it could ever have been maintained. It becomes much easier to understand if we recognise that the daughter of the marriage is expected to marry in the mother's brother's village. The land can thus revert to the people of the original village by a series of two uterine transfers. The system looks a little like the 'rope' of the Mundugumor (Mead 1935), and the latter may well have a similar explanation. It has a clear political utility as the dual allegiance pattern forms the basis of Orokaiva political alliances. It is buttressed by religious beliefs, as the spirit of a male child may be derived from either an agnatic or a uterine ancestor, by the process of reincarnation to which I have already referred.

Ultimately there would appear to be two possible outcomes of such hereditary land gifts: fusion of the reciprocating pairs of groups into one local clan group and separation on more or less hostile terms. These two outcomes correspond to the two modalities of the marriage system. The hostile modality is not a *failure* of the system but a natural and accepted part of it. Thus, the frequent migration of groups, as evidenced in Sivepe and many parts of New Guinea, should not be regarded as purely adventitious, but is structurally determined as part of a system which, as we have seen, could not work over a long period with a static population.[4]

The frequent exchanges of cooked taro reported in Chapter VI tend to keep

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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reciprocating pairs of groups in a state of pseudo-commensality. They share not only the land but also its products. The symbolic significance of taro, as set out in that chapter, accords with this theory. Symbolically, taro are children of the marriage of the donors; they are constantly being given away both inside and outside the *simbo* relationship.

On the other hand, the pig belongs essentially to the sphere of *dorobu* marriage, not only because pigs are always sacrificed on such occasions, but because they are the institutionalised means whereby a negative cycle of reciprocity can be made positive.

Again, the coconut-betelnut myth has not merely to do with marriage as the union of two partners or even families, but is a charter for the offering of these nuts on the graves of affines by a large group of survivors who gathered for a mortuary ceremony – a ceremony which often brought together a number of entire villages. The ritual celebrates (as the myth also indicates) the ideal of sister exchange marriage.

This brief summary shows the relationship of objects of mediation to social structure. Social structure, in the sense in which I am using the term, is most clearly articulated in the marriage system, though other systems (e.g. institutionalised hereditary friendship) may also provide important clues to the structure. If the study of objects of mediation provides no more than a manual of some Orokaiva magic, the social structure provides the ultimate rationale of this magic. The structure, as analysed in this chapter, has the objectivity of a mathematical formula. The living fabric of the society has a beauty which we can never ignore and which perhaps forms the *raison d'être* of much of our study. We find this living actuality in the magical processes whereby social relationships are established, maintained and broken. We find it in the pattern of alternation of friendship and enmity, in the unpredictability of the duration of any positive or negative cycle. Barnes (1962) came very close to recognising this pattern when he suggested that the difference between African and New Guinean models may be explained by the New Guinean preoccupation with *killing*. Certainly the Orokaiva world view is greatly preoccupied with killing.

Perhaps this is a price one pays for the orientation towards exchange: one must always be prepared to see a positive cycle of reciprocity break down and a negative one begin, often in a most violent manner. Clearly, the corporate group is not a concept which leads to a full understanding of the basic operation of such a culture. It is for this reason that I have attempted an analysis in which the marriage system is the key to ... structure and the institutions arise out of the operation of exchange, structured according to magical formulae which are themselves moulded by the marriage system.

REFERENCES

1. Some discrepancies between Williams' terms and mine may be due to local differences or to cultural changes. It is possible that the modern prevalence of the multi-clan village has led to reduced use of the *simbo* category and to the dropping of the term *behere* between members of the same generation. Culture change may also account for the reduced use of self-reciprocal terms between alternate generations.

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000 2. E. G. and J. D. Krige describe a particularly clear example (1943: Ch. IX; 1939) among the Lovedu.

583 606 578 3. I discussed in Chapter VII the Orokaiva device of using anger for the mediation of social relations. Monica Wilson has described a somewhat similar mechanism for the Nyakusa (1952: 99–112; 1959: 161, 165, 217). Among the Orokaiva, however, two opposite tendencies are at work: the obligation to express at once the anger one feels and the offender's obligation to assuage that anger (whether justified or not). Much Orokaiva exchange involves prestations made by one party to compensate for anger felt by the other.

While 'anger in the heart' is disapproved by Orokaiva, most actual misfortunes are explained by anger existing in someone else's heart. The guilty person is deemed to be he who, though aware of his anger, does nothing to remove it. It is most often the victim of the angry person's retribution who is expected to feel guilty. One may show anger by harming one*self*. Such action, while overtly non-aggressive, is in fact a threatening signal to the causer of the anger.

000 4. A similar discovery was made by Watson (1970) in a paper based on New Guinea Highlands data, entitled 'Society as Organised Flow'.

Chapter 4

The cash economy

434 a. Income and expenditure[1]

[127] [128] Data collected from each household on its income and expenditure for 1962 are set out in Tables 6 and 7. There were no written records available to check the amounts which informants claimed they had received or paid but detailed discussions were held on each specific item and inconsistencies were re-examined. An average of $34 had passed through each householder's hands and he could fairly easily recall details of the major transactions.

[511] Per capita income was approximately $6.60 for the year while expenditure was $8.20. The reduction during the year in the amount of cash in hand is due to the fact that individuals who had employment which terminated late in 1961 or early 1962 drew on cash reserves during 1962.

Of a total income of $328 for the 12 households, 27 per cent was derived from paid employment, 24 per cent from the sale of primary produce and 24 per cent from marriage payments; a further 13 per cent was money received from kin employed in other districts of Papua and 12 per cent came from kinsmen in the neighbourhood (see Table 6).

[511] Major items of expenditure were store purchases of food, clothing, household utensils and other equipment such as a shotgun and torches. These accounted for 62 per cent of total expenditure. In many instances the goods were distributed or shared among 2 or 3 households of the expanded family and sometimes more widely than this. Some householders shared the receipts [583] of large bride price with other kin during the year but no one had [431] had to contribute to bride price payments on behalf of kin. Of $410 paid out by the 12 householders in this period 22 per cent

[1] Figures given in this section are corrected to the last digit given.

434 was in recognition of kinship obligations including bride price
[513] and gifts while 49 per cent of income was derived from these
[431] sources.
[525]

Gambling does not appear to be common within the village but intervillage visits are not infrequently arranged for this purpose. Few men in the sample claimed any significant winnings or losses for the year but during our stay some men, in one evening's gambling, lost $22 to members of another village who had already won $10 from them in 1962.

454 None of the 12 householders were holding personal savings at the time of our survey; in 3 instances where men had formerly been wage-earners for some time they had opened Savings Bank accounts which they retained.

A son's wife living with 1 householder had received some money from her kinsmen and some from her husband who was absent in employment. The money had been banked but was not recorded in our survey.

Apart from $60 in savings certificates maturing in 1966 which are contributions to joint accounts (see Appendix B), the ratio of current savings ($10 per household) to annual income is 1:2.7. Savings had decreased by 40 per cent during 1962 but income also seems to have been considerably higher in the previous year.

In a sample of 13 men from a nearby area in 1951 Belshaw (1951:12) found that only slight withdrawals had been made from pass books issued about 2 years earlier under the War Damage Compensation scheme; almost no deposits had been made. The average account had a balance of £4 with a range from £1.17s. to £8.1s. The same people claimed to hold other cash in hand ranging
[131] from nil to £39 with an average of just under £10. A small part of this may have been cash payments made under the scheme. Refugees from the Mt Lamington eruption received other payments later from a relief fund. We could obtain no reliable information to account for any money received by members of our sample on either occasion.

436 The evidence is slight but a comparison of the 2 small samples suggests the possibility that with an increase over 10 years in the range of sources of income and in consumer demand, money is now circulating more freely in the area.

[301] Shell and bone ornaments (hambo) and head-dresses (di) - made
[23] from feathers of the bird-of-paradise, mountain parrots, hornbills
[32] and cassowaries - known collectively as di hambo, are held by the
[555] people of Sivepo as a category of wealth, items in ceremonial presentations and as objects of display. In traditional Orokaiva society these are prestige tokens but seem never to have served as

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 80]

A, [See Category 454, pp. 107-108--Analyst]

436 a standard of value. However, to some extent money seems to have
[555] taken over some of the functions of traditional valuables and in
some situations one is exchanged for the other. In the past it
[301] was recognized that skill and initiative in hunting and trading
[237] were necessary to acquire di hambo but today, with safer communi-
[321] cations and better hunting equipment, they are more easily obtained.
People are willing to buy some of the more valuable items or some
[439] cheaper items of European manufacture which can be adapted to
serve as a novel decoration.

Although they constituted the greater part of the goods changing
[428] hands on traditional ceremonial occasions, di hambo are evidently
not now circulating rapidly. A little less than half of these
valuables held by members of the sample had been inherited and
nearly a quarter had been acquired by the owner by hunting or
collecting.

A complete adjustment between the roles of money and of non-
monetary valuables has not yet been made. They circulate in the
same exchanges and both are considered essential; it may now be
[583] accepted practice that each should be contributed by or distributed
amongst different categories of kin on these occasions.[1] But the
opinion was widely expressed that as people are increasingly
demanding cash as a large part of bride price payments, the
intrinsic value of these exchanges was correspondingly less.

435 Although money and traditional valuables are not freely inter-
changeable, we collected details of the prices paid for any items
of di hambo which had been purchased by the sample,[2] and by using
these in conjunction with the unitary scale of value on which
informants could readily place all items, we assessed the possible
cash equivalent of non-monetary valuables acquired by the 12 house-
holds from various sources. This is set out in Table 8.

Table 8

Cash value and acquisition of hambo and di
($)

	Inherited	Purchased	Bride price or other exchange	Made or bought	Total
Hambo	48.00	9.30	17.70	16.60	92.00
Di	17.00	4.50	6.50	15.40	44.00
Total	66.00	13.80	24.20	32.00	136.00

1 See Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:52.

2 These prices were very nearly the same as those recorded at Inonda (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963: Appendix B).

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Bride and groom outside the organizer's house on the morning of the first day of the bride-wealth exchange

[516]

Transferring the cash

[p. 80]

I

The inclusion of cash in bride-wealth is now widespread in Papua-New Guinea. Before cash was introduced, ornaments made from shells, pigs' tusks, dogs' teeth, animal fur, etc., and feather head-dresses, household utensils, pigs and food were commonly exchanged for brides in most, if not all, parts of the country. These things are still given in the majority of bride-wealth exchanges, even when the people consider cash the most important component. Bride-wealth is usually exchanged between two groups, one associated with the bride and the other with the groom, with the result that a considerable number of people is associated with any one exchange.[1]

We do not know the volume of cash exchanged annually in bride-wealth in the country nor the rate at which this volume is changing, but the information available suggests that a significant proportion of the cash in the indigenous sector of the economy is involved. For example, in Hanuabada village near Port Moresby (where the legal minimum cash wage is a little over $300 per annum) bride-wealth including more than $2000 in cash has been paid for a single marriage. In many rural areas, the ratio of cash in marriage payments to cash incomes is also high. In a Siane village in the Eastern Highlands, where the average annual cash income per household in 1965 was less than $100, I counted $240 cash in one bride-wealth exchange and $180 in another.

There is insufficient information to permit analysis of the implications which certain practices in the indigenous sector have for the growth and functioning of the cash economy of Papua-New Guinea. These practices include bride-wealth exchanges, cash gift exchanges, gambling and hoarding. They may be beneficial to economic growth in that they may provide incentives to produce goods and services for sale. Also they may facilitate cash

[1] The collection of data for this paper was made possible by the generous co-operation of numerous people from Inonda and nearby villages, especially Stephen Oriri and Jack Umbarapa. Dr R.G. Crocombe kindly assisted in the preparation of the report; Mr C. Burau explained marriage customs among the Orokaiva; and Miss P. Richardson, Mr M. Rimoldi and Mr P. Krinks gave helpful suggestions for revision.

investment in the villages, for there is scope for an astute and influential individual to use them to accumulate cash which may subsequently be invested. On the other hand, an institution such as bride-wealth may be detrimental in that an individual may consider it pointless to earn more cash if a large proportion is to be used to assist kin in exchanges which do not benefit him directly. Also an individual may have difficulty in accumulating cash for investment if social pressures force him to contribute a high proportion of his cash income to non-commercial exchanges.

In addition we have no clear understanding of the degree to which and circumstances under which an individual's participation in ceremonial exchanges involving cash affords him access to the land, labour and capital resources of the group to which he belongs. Some indigenous entrepreneurs minimize their participation in these exchanges while others apparently attempt to use them to advantage.

The following description of an Orokaiva marriage and bride-wealth exchange does not contain sufficient information to allow generalizations about economic implications but may be a useful contribution to a comprehensive study of customary exchanges. The activities associated with the marriage involved people from several villages and hamlets as well as a nearby land settlement scheme. The events spread over approximately two and a half months culminating in the payment and distribution of the bride-wealth at the end of August 1962.

II

Traditionally, an Orokaiva man could acquire a wife by payment of bride-wealth; by exchange of a girl from his lineage, sub-clan or clan for another from an outside group; by elopement; or by capture (Williams 1930:130). When Europeans gained control of the Orokaiva area early in the century, marriage by capture, which had been common, was no longer possible. Since then, other aspects of marriage among the Orokaiva have changed. People may now move freely within the Orokaiva area and elsewhere, and consequently the range of villages from which an individual may choose a spouse is wider than in the pre-contact period. Furthermore, many marriages now take place at least partly in accordance with church practices. Missions[1] have failed to suppress exchanges of bride-wealth and it

[1] The Anglican Mission has been operating in the area for over 50 years and has been the most influential evangelical institution there.

583 is still transferred in most marriages, including those which take
107 place in a church.
799 Polygyny was accepted but probably not frequent in traditional
Orokaiva society. In spite of mission opposition there are still
595 instances of polygyny but the great majority of marriages are
monogamous. Marriage outside the clan is considered preferable
614 but there are numerous cases of marriage within the clan. The
village is not considered an exogamous unit. Marriages are usually
582 patrilocal but this is not a definite rule (cf. Williams 1930:130-3).
[621]
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III

584 In this particular marriage the groom lived in Inonda, a village of approximately 45 people about 11 miles from Popondetta.[1] His was the only family of the Jegotumo lineage of the Andiriha clan in Inonda, although there were others at Hohota I and Kakendetta.[2] The groom was the eldest child by his father's first wife. His mother died several years before his marriage and his father remarried. The father died six weeks before the marriage payment described here took place.

The groom attended Anglican mission schools for eight years and reached Standard V. He was baptized in 1958. In 1960, when he was about 16, he left school to train as a medical orderly at a mission hospital at Embi about ten miles from Inonda. In 1962 he returned to his father's household in Inonda and was employed by the government for $3 per week to tend the ford where the road from Popondetta to Oro Bay crossed the Girua river. He also assisted with the production of coffee, from which the household earned approximately $16.00 annually, and with the household's food gardens.

The bride attended mission schools for four years and reached Standard III but was not baptized. Her father, who died during World War II, had been the head of Joremba'embo lineage and of the Andiriha sub-clan in Inonda as well as headman of that village. After her father's death the bride went with her mother, elder sister and brother to live with her mother's elder brother at Ajoro village about five miles away. In 1948 a parallel cousin of her father was demobilized from the army and married her mother, thereby becoming her adoptive father (to be referred to hereafter simply as her father). Subsequently she lived in his household in Inonda

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

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[1] See map, p.84A*

[2] See diagram, p.85A and Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:14-25.

A [See Category 102, p. 84--Analyst]

B [See Category 583, p. 85--Analyst]

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Diagram showing locations of Andiriha and Jego'undi clans and social units comprising Inonda



C = contributed to bride-wealth
R = received share of bride-wealth
NP = took no part in the exchange
X = sole male representative was youth adopted into groom's father's household

where he was headman for about 12 years. In 1960 he moved his household to a block he was allocated in a land settlement project a short distance from Inonda across the Girua River, but he continued to exert strong influence in the affairs of Inonda. 584

A man from Sewa wished to marry the girl but her father and brother opposed the marriage because, they said, her married sister at Sewa was not happy there. When the present groom returned to Inonda in 1962 she was attracted to him and rejected the Sewa man in his favour. The Sewa man's family were displeased and it was rumoured that they were responsible for the sorcery which caused the groom's father to die.

Late in June, without her father's permission, the bride stayed in the groom's household for a few days and the couple made it known that they wished to marry. The bride's father and brother, especially the former, opposed the marriage. They gave several reasons, but it is difficult to know which was the most important. They said they were angry because she 'ran away' to live in the groom's father's house and that they wished her to marry a man of better prospects and from a family of greater prestige. Her brother, formerly a mission teacher, said she should be baptized so that she could have a church marriage, but this did not happen. Both bride and groom were of the Andiriha clan, but this deviation from the Orokaiva preference for clan exogamy was never openly used as a basis for objection to the marriage.

The bride-wealth for the marriage was set, principally by the bride's father, at $200 in cash and the equivalent of $200 comprising a pig, traditional valuables,[1] household utensils and food. Villagers considered this an extremely high price and evidence collected in the village suggests this was so (see Table 1). An Orokaiva research assistant who had travelled widely through the area said it was unusually high for a small clan such as the Andiriha, although not unusual for large clans.[2] Moreover, as the marriage was endogamous to the clan, the groom could not call on the entire clan's support. 583 [114]

The bride's father said he needed the money to establish a retail store and to buy a motor vehicle, but in September 1965 he had not realized these ambitions. His opposition to the marriage may have moved him to set a high price in the hope of discouraging the groom. However, informants said it was not unusual for a parent or guardian to make a display of anger towards a daughter's [584]

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[1] Traditional ornaments, and feather headdresses will be referred to collectively as 'traditional valuables'.

[2] C. Burau, personal communication.

Table 1

583 Bride-wealth paid for three women married into, and two marrying out of Andiriha sub-clan, Inonda

	In 1	In 2*	In 3	Out 1	Out 2**
Approximate date	1961	1958	1953	1960	1964-5
Cash	$74	$22	$40	$22	$74
Pigs	2	?	1	?	nil
Traditional valuables, utensils, etc.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	?
Food Approx.	$12	Yes	Yes	Yes	?

* Woman with illegitimate child.
** Required of a man from Madang District for a girl of Joremba'embo lineage.

[584] suitor (cf. Williams 1930:31, 141, 144, 149-50). The people of Inonda were aware of high prices paid for women near Port Moresby[1] and the bride's father, a man of high prestige in the area, may have been attempting to raise local prices towards the level of prices in urban areas.

The groom and his father complained about the price but accepted it as a challenge which must be answered by payment.

Between the time the price was set and the time it was paid, bride and groom spent much time together. For about three weeks the groom and a classificatory sister lived at the bride's father's farm where they helped with farm work. One weekend the bride, groom and bride's father went on a fishing expedition, indicating that the bride's father had consented to the marriage.

583 614 768 About a month before the bride-wealth was paid the groom's father died and the responsibility for organizing the payment passed to the head of the Darafa'embo lineage of the Andiriha sub-clan in Hohota II. This man will be referred to as 'the organizer'. Ideally the responsibility would have passed to a senior man of the Jegotumo lineage in Inonda, but the groom himself was the most senior. The responsibility could have devolved to the senior man of Jegotumo lineage in either Hohota I or Kakendetta, where Jegotumo was represented, but the only Jegotumo

[1] Bride-wealth exchanges in Hanuabada, Central District, at the time were mostly in the range $600-$1200 in cash plus an equivalent amount in traditional valuables (N.D. Oram, personal communication).

man in Hohota I was in his late twenties and had insufficient status in the Andiriha clan to organize the payment. There were two senior Jegotumo men in Kakendetta but the responsibility went to neither, probably because Kakendetta was 11 miles from Inonda and the groom's father's household had little contact with them. Inonda people said that the reason the position of 'organizer' passed to the head of the Darafa'embo lineage in Hohota was that about the turn of this century his father and the groom's paternal grandfather had fled together from Aramba to Hohota and that the common history of the two families placed the organizer in a special relationship with the groom (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:14). 583 614 768

Several times during the two and a half months over which the bride-wealth was accumulated, the bride's father embarrassed the groom and his supporters by saying publicly that they were slow to meet the payment and that he thought they were incapable of doing so. About five days before the event the groom and his supporters arranged with the bride's father that the exchange should take place on Friday, 30 August at Hohota II. 583

On Thursday, part of the food contributed by Hohota people was stacked in a shade-house adjacent to the organizer's house. That evening four men from Hohota went to Inonda to assist the Inonda men to carry to Hohota a large and valuable pig which had belonged to the groom's father and was to be part of the bride-wealth.

At 6.00 a.m. on the day of the ceremony the groom's supporters began to gather at the organizer's residence at Hohota. All were assembled by 10.30 a.m. The food they brought was stacked near the shade-house and the traditional valuables on the verandah of the residence. Both bride and groom had spent the night at Hohota but they took only minor parts in the preparation of the bride-wealth.

At 6.30 a.m. a party of five women, including the bride's father's two wives (one of them the bride's mother) and the bride's mother's brother's wife, stood outside the organizer's house berating the groom's family for failing to have the bride-wealth completely ready. These women had come to collect a preliminary payment, kina, contributed by close relatives of the groom and distributed amongst close relatives of the bride to indicate to the bride's family that she is marrying into a family of wealth. Some cash, traditional valuables, household utensils, food and several pieces of bark-cloth were handed to the women, who stacked them into string bags and returned at 8.30 a.m. to the bride's father's house, two miles away.

At 7.30 a.m. other members of the Jegotumo lineage and people who had come to the ceremony smeared the groom, his stepmother, stepsister and other close relatives with a paste of mud, ashes

and leaves which irritates the skin. This was accompanied by general merriment. It was said to be a tradition, though the people gave no explanation of its significance. The women chattered together while they prepared and cooked taro, and most men sat in the shade-house chewing betel and talking. The groom and the organizer collected firewood and erected a temporary shelter of coconut fronds adjacent to the shade-house. From 9.30 a.m. to 10.30 a.m. some of the groom's close female kin dressed the bride, decorating her with traditional ornaments, fastening a bark-cloth sarong around her and spraying her hair with fresh coconut oil. The groom's supporters expected the bride's father and his party to arrive at Hohota at midday. When they did not, the waiting group became restless.

The bride's father had summoned the people who were to share the bride-wealth to his house to discuss the attitude they would adopt towards the contributing party when the two groups met at Hohota. They decided to irritate the groom's supporters by delaying and did not arrive until 3.00 p.m. As they approached the organizer's house, a man dressed in bark-cloth and ornaments and carrying a spear emerged from amongst them. A similarly attired man advanced from the organizer's party, who rose to their feet. The two men faced each other about thirty yards apart and, brandishing their spears, repeatedly rushed at each other and retreated for approximately five minutes.[1] During this time the bride's father's party moved quietly towards the organizer's house and the two groups sat on the ground outside.

Apart from the bride and the two men carrying spears, people wore normal clothing, although some had armbands and necklaces which may have been specially donned for the occasion.

The bride's father, who remained standing, asked whether the bride-wealth was ready. The organizer replied that it would not be ready until the bride's father sat down. This clearly offended him and tension quickly mounted in both groups. An argument broke out and climaxed when two of the groom's supporters accused the bride's father of setting an unreasonably high price and of lacking generosity by refusing to reduce it when the groom's father died. Thoroughly aroused, the bride's father shouted that he would not accept the payment, that he would take his daughter and in high dudgeon stalked off. The bride's brother supported him by returning $3.00 which had been given as part of the kina. Three people who each contributed $2.00 to the main payment withdrew the money during the dispute.

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[1] Williams (1930:141) notes that a similar manoeuvre, esu, which involved many supporters of bride and groom, was 'highly characteristic' of bride-wealth transfers in the 1920s.

A debate lasting two hours followed during which tensions subsided. The bride did not seem at all perturbed and while the dispute was in progress she sat out quite cheerfully after her father. The groom stood silently at the back of the assembly and took little part in the dispute. 583

About 4.30 p.m. a Girua settler who was present and whom the bride's father greatly respected offered to mediate. He originally came from a village near Oro Bay which had only very distant kinship ties with Inonda and surrounding villages. He went to the bride's father who was waiting about half a mile away and persuaded him to allow the marriage to proceed. There was no formal presentation or acceptance of the goods. The groom's supporters had heaped the food outside the shade-house, placed the utensils and some traditional valuables on the verandah of the organiser's house and tied other traditional valuables to a bamboo pole standing near the house. While the crowd was dispersing, the bride's mother and a few members of her group loaded the pig, food and valuables into a vehicle for transportation to the bride's father's farm. The cash was not paid until the next day.

Next morning the organizer and four of the groom's supporters took the cash to the bride's father's farm. A mat was placed outside the house and a few of the bride's father's supporters sat on one side with the groom's on the other. Other men and a few women crowded round to watch. The young Jegotumo man from Hohota who had contributed most cash to the bride-wealth and who, by virtue of being a talented gambler, was adept with money, counted the notes and arranged them neatly on the mat. They were counted and carefully rearranged several times over about 15 minutes, after which the groom's supporters left. The people's interest in the payment of the money contrasted with the apparent lack of interest in the transfer of other components of the bride-wealth.

The bride-wealth was distributed on two days. Immediately after the cash had been presented a brother of the bride's mother and a relative of the bride's father placed the food, household utensils and less valuable feathers and ornaments into 16 piles, some comprised of food, some of food and utensils and some of food, utensils and traditional valuables. The two men then allocated the piles, each of a different value, to particular people. The bride's father held up the more valuable feathers and ornaments for all to see and offered each item to a specific man. If he did not accept readily, the item was offered to another man. The pig was killed, carefully cut into pieces of different sizes, and distributed.

Next day, without ceremony and when few people were present, the bride's father and brother distributed the cash, retaining just

under 90 per cent for themselves. The balance was shared amongst four men, two of whom were absent.

IV

In examining the factors which influenced the size of a particular household's contribution to, or share of, the bride-wealth, cash values have been assigned to the non-monetary components (see appendix). However, it should be noted that the cash value of a contribution is only an approximate indicator of the magnitude of obligation of a contributing household to the groom, because the wealth of the household must have influenced the quantity and type of goods it could contribute. Wealth per se would not have influenced the share of the payment received by a household.

Householders from more than 20 clans in eight villages took part in the exchange, but men of at least ten other clans in these villages did not. The multiple relationships between contributors and between recipients were too complex to record in detail.

The value of the kina was only $29.35 as against $172.20 for the main bride-wealth (compare Tables 2 and 3). The people who contributed to the kina were either closely related genealogically to the groom or had high status within the contributing group (e.g., the organizer and the head of the Jegotumo lineage in Kakendetta village). Unfortunately the distribution of the kina was not followed sufficiently closely to determine whether the goods went only to those closely related to the bride or of high status within the recipient group.

Details of the contributions to the total bride-wealth (main payment and kina) and the approximate genealogical relationships of the groom to the heads of the households which contributed are shown in Table 3. The physical distances of the households from Inonda are also shown. The households have been separated into seven categories.

1. Local households of the groom's lineage. These were the household of the groom's late father (in which the groom lived) at Inonda and that of his parallel cousin at Hohota I. Together they contributed approximately 80 per cent of the total value of the bride-wealth and just under 90 per cent of the cash component, with the groom's household making the larger total contribution. The cash contributed by the groom's household was approximately equal to one year's income for the household.

The household of the groom's parallel cousin contributed about a quarter of the total payment. As well as close genealogical ties, this man had a close personal relationship with the groom.

A [See Category 435, p. 101--Analyst]

13: Hogbin E-5 (1962) 1966 OJ23 Orobaiva OJ23 Inonda

Table 2

Estimated cash value of contributions to kina

	Village	Contribution					
		Cash	Traditional valuables $	Bark-cloth $	Household durables $	Food $	Total
Groom	Inonda		7.90			0.50	8.40
Groom's stepmother	Inonda			3.75		0.80	4.55
Organizer	Hohota		1.80		0.20		2.00
Head of Jegotumo lineage at Kakendetta	Kakendetta	2.00*			0.70		2.70
Mother of groom's parallel cousin	Hohota I		0.40	2.25			2.65
Andiriha women closely related to groom's father	Hohota	1.00*		1.50	1.20	0.30	4.00
Groom's mother's eldest brother	Urio		1.40		0.50		1.90
Groom's stepmother's brother	Urio		0.40	2.25	0.50		3.15
Total		3.00*	11.90	9.75	3.10	1.60	29.35

* Returned by bride's brother at dispute at bride-wealth transfer.

583

2. Distant households of the groom's lineage. The two other households of the groom's lineage contributed only a little over 1 per cent of the total payment. They contributed a further $4.00 in cash but during the dispute the bride's brother returned $2.00 and the other $2.00 were withdrawn. Neither householder was genealogically close to the groom and he had formed no close personal relationships with them, probably because they were at Kakendetta, 11 miles from Inonda. The four households in categories 1 and 2 constituted the entire Jegotumo lineage.

3. Local households of the groom's clan (but not lineage). These were the households of the organizer and of an Inonda man. Although the organizer's household gave only $4.00 in cash, the value of the food, ornaments, and feather head-dresses it contributed was greater than that of any household except the groom's. In terms of its assets and cash income the contribution was substantial, though small in relation to the contributions of the households of category 1.

The head of the other household in category 3 was of the bride's lineage, Joremba'embo. He was in an ambiguous situation because when his father died, his mother remarried the groom's father who adopted him. He had genealogical associations with the bride's father's household as well as more distant genealogical links, close adoptive links and close physical association with the groom. Inonda people stated without reservation that he was a member of the bride's lineage. He stayed away when the bride-wealth was transferred, but his wife contributed a small quantity of food.

4. Local households of other clans with wives from groom's clan. The contributions of the three households in this category averaged $4.72.

5. Local households of other clans (wives not Andiriha). In contrast with the households of category 4, the average value of the contributions from the eight households in this category was only $1.16. This suggests that, because of agnatic and affinal links to the Andiriha, the households in category 4 were obliged to contribute more than those in category 5 which had only very distant genealogical links, if any, to the Andiriha.

6. Other households of the groom's village. Of the eight households in Inonda only three contributed to the bride-wealth. Two of the three which contributed have been included in categories above. The head of the third household was in an anomalous situation. He had been a school-teacher at a mission station formerly adjacent to Inonda. He remained after the station was closed and the Inonda people permitted him to live near the village where two of his daughters were married to Andiriha men, one being the wife of the bride's brother. His security in Inonda depended on acceptance by the villagers and possibly because of this he was

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 96]

Table 3

Contributors to bride-wealth analysed by physical and genealogical distance from the groom's household
(size and type of contribution shown)

	HOUSEHOLD HEAD IN ANDIRIHA CLAN									
	Joreuko'eubo (bride's) lineage	Jogotume (groom's) lineage				Boraifa'eubo lineage	Married to Andiriha women			
Village	INONDA			KAKEMBETTA	BOROTA I	BOROTA II			ORIO	
Distance by road from Inonda	1/8 mile	Nil		11 miles	3 mile	5 miles			7 miles	
Category	6	3	1	2	1	3	4	5	7	
Household head	Temp. resident, 2 dghtrs married to Andiriha	Man of bride's lineage adopted by groom's father	Groom (late father's household)	Jogotume lineage	Groom's parallel cousin	The organiser	Married to Andiriha woman	Locally resident; no close relationship	Mother's kin	TOTAL
No. of households	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	8	2	20
Cash	$ -	$ -	$ 70.00	$ *	$ 40.00	$ 4.00	$ 4.00**	$ 2.00	$ ***	$ 80.00
Pig	-	-	60.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.00
Traditional valuables	2.00	-	7.90	-	2.40	4.20	3.80	4.10	1.80	28.20
Kerk-cloth	-	-	3.75	-	2.25	-	1.50	-	2.25	9.75
Household goods	0.30	-	2.50	0.70	6.20	0.20	2.10	-	1.00	13.00
Food	0.25	0.45	1.45	0.75	1.30	1.95	2.75	1.20	0.30	10.60
TOTAL	2.55	0.45	105.80	1.45	52.15	10.35	14.15	9.30	5.35	201.55
Average contribution per household in column	2.55	0.45	105.80	0.73	52.15	10.35	4.72	1.16	2.68	
Per cent of total bride-wealth contributed by households in column	1%	Negligible	53%	1%	26%	5%	7%	4%	3%	
Contribution by village (per cent of total in parenthesis)	108.80 (54%)			1.45 (1%)	52.15 (26%)		33.80 (15%)		5.35 (3%)	
Contribution by Andiriha lineages (per cent of total in parenthesis)	Joreuko'eubo 0.45 (negligible)	Jogotume 159.40 (80%)				Boraifa'eubo 10.35 (5%)				
Contribution by Andiriha households (per cent of total in parenthesis)	ANDIRIHA HOUSEHOLDS 170.20 (85%)						14.15 (7%)			

* $4.00 contributed but $2.00 returned by bride's brother at dispute and $2.00 withdrawn after dispute.
** Another $1.00 contributed to him but returned by bride's brother at dispute.
*** $4.00 contributed but withdrawn after dispute.

Table 4

Distribution of bride-wealth by household categorised by descent group of household head

(some items not recorded)

Category number and description	Village	Distance from Inonda	No. of households by clan of household head	Cash £	Traditional valuables £	Bark-cloth £	Household goods £	Food £	Total £	Average per household in category (approx.) £
1. Local household of Joreuba'unbo (bride's) lineage	G.L.S.S.* Inonda	1 mile 0	1 Andiriba 1 Andiriba	70.00	?	?	?	?	in excess of 70.00	in excess of 35.00
2. Local households of Andiriba clan (but not Joreuba'unbo lineage)	Inonda	0	2 Andiriba	-	0.50			0.20	0.70	0.35
3. Distant household of Andiriba clan (but not Joreuba'unbo lineage)	Jegereta	8 miles	1 Andiriba	-				0.10	0.10	0.10
4. Households affinally and matrilineally related to bride's father's lineage (and some to bride's mother's lineage)	Inonda Nogoa " " "	0 1 mile " " "	2 Jego'undi 2 Unuhuba 2 Ukuru'undi 1 Arubaga 1 Aneta'undi 2 ?	2.00	5.85	0.75		1.05	9.65	0.95
5. Households with affinal and kinship ties to bride's mother's lineage	Ajura " " "	3 miles " " "	3 Tandai'undi 1 Unagiri'undi 1 Ojael'undi 2 ?	8.00	9.50	3.75	1.00	1.60	23.85	3.40
6. Households of bride's sister's husband and his father	Sova	7 miles	2 Sauharupa	-	0.40	1.50		0.25	2.15	1.05
7. Household with no genealogical relationship to bride	G.L.S.S.	1 mile	1 ?	-	1.60	0.75		0.25	2.60	2.60
TOTAL RECORDED DISTRIBUTION				80.00	17.85	6.75	1.00	3.45	in excess of 109.05	
COMPARE WITH: TOTAL CONTRIBUTION				80.00	29.20	9.75	13.00	10.40	201.55	

* Girua land settlement scheme.

notably generous with gifts. It might otherwise be expected that he would have avoided the ceremonies or aligned himself with the bride's group, especially as the husbands of his daughters received shares of the bride-wealth. However, he contributed goods worth $2.55. 583

Of the five households in Inonda which did not contribute, the heads of two were brothers from the Jego'undi clan (not the Jegotumo lineage). Their mother was of the Joremba'embo lineage of the Andiriha and they therefore received a small share of the bride-wealth. The head of another of the five households was the bride's brother. The heads of the other two households were brothers and were considered by the villagers to be members of the organiser's lineage (Darafa'embo) because their father had been adopted into the Darafa'embo after being captured from a Managalasi tribe. In contrast with the organiser who had a dominant role in the contributing group, they received small shares of the bride-wealth at least partly because their mother was of the bride's lineage, and possibly because one of the brothers married the sister of the bride's brother's wife.

7. Households of the groom's matrikin. These were the households of the groom's mother's brother and his stepmother's brother, both from Urio village about seven miles from Inonda. No others of the groom's matrikin contributed.

Of the heads of the 20 households which contributed, only six were from the Andiriha clan and four of the six were of the Jegotumo lineage. If the bride had been a member of another clan, other Andiriha households probably would have contributed. Most of the 12 householders from Hohota II who contributed had no close genealogical relationship with the groom. They may have contributed because his father had lived there for many years before shifting to Inonda. However, the obligations could have been primarily to the organiser, a Hohota man.

V

The analysis of the distribution of the bride-wealth is not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, there were difficulties in observation. For example, some of the pork and other food was cooked and eaten while the distribution was taking place; some was handed to people to be given to others; and valuation of the pork cuts was impossible. All households which shared in other components of the bride-wealth were given pork, the choicest portions going to those which received the largest shares of other items. Some household utensils given in the bride-wealth were used 583 125

583 to cook and serve the food. The ultimate recipients of these were
123 not ascertained. Secondly, most recipients were from Mosou and Ajoro, villages in which there were many clans. Complete analysis was not possible because detailed genealogies were not collected and because both the father and mother of the bride had genealogical links with Mosou village. Nevertheless, sufficient information was collected to indicate some of the principles underlying the distribution.

583 Households which shared in the bride-wealth have been catego-
[123] rized according to the head's approximate relationship to the bride (see Table 4).[1]

Category 1 included the households of the bride's father and brother. These men controlled the distribution of the cash and retained just under 90 per cent, each taking $35. Although the father directly controlled the distribution of the more valuable traditional ornaments almost all the non-monetary components went to other households.

Two other local households of the Andiriha received shares of the bride-wealth (category 2). Their shares were small, possibly because they were of neither the bride's nor the groom's lineages and were therefore to some extent in a neutral position regarding the marriage (see also page 96).

Only one household of the Andiriha clan from a distant village (category 3) shared in the bride-wealth and the share was very small. This parallels the small contributions of the two distant households of the groom's lineage. The only Andiriha households known by the Inonda people to have taken no part in the marriage were from Hanakiro, a village about 20 miles away.

A large number of households with heads affinally and matrilineally related to the bride's father (category 4) received modest shares of the bride-wealth. The genealogical ties of three of these households were reinforced by assistance which the heads had given with the ceremonies performed when the bride attained puberty, at which time her father was absent from Inonda. Some households in the category had genealogical ties to the bride's mother as well.

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[1] It is possible that I was not aware of some cases where two or more recipients lived in the same household and if so, they have been listed in Table 4 as separate households. For example, an aged woman and her son may have received separate shares. Their relationships to the bride, as described to me, would not indicate whether they were in the same household and they would be recorded as separate households.

Householders with affinal and kinship ties to the bride's mother (category 5) received a larger share of the bride-wealth per household than all others except those of category 1. Moreover, the brother of the bride's mother, another close patrilineal relative of the mother and the husband of the bride's mother's sister (with whom the bride had stayed while her father was at the war) were given cash. These three men received comparatively large shares of other components of the bride-wealth. One of the reasons the households of this category received comparatively large shares may have been that the bride's mother's clan (Tandai'undi) from Ajoro village had formerly transferred rights to a substantial area of land to the Andiriha sub-clan in Inonda. The Inonda people are afraid that if the land is reclaimed, a court may uphold the claim and they therefore attempt to remain on friendly terms with Tandai'undi clan and Ajoro village. This appears to be manifested by generosity in their exchange relationships with Ajoro. 583

The bride's sister's husband and his father (category 6) received small shares.

The only man who received a share but who had no genealogical relationship to the bride was a settler on the Girua land settlement scheme where the bride lived (category 7). His inclusion indicates a flexibility in the exchange system wherein residential proximity without historical or genealogical relationship permits the establishment of exchange relationships.

VI

Less than half the cash demanded was paid and villagers considered that the value of other components of the bride-wealth was well below the target set by the bride's father. At the time they said that more cash would be paid when the groom's supporters sold land to the Administration, but by September 1965 no sale had been effected and no further bride-wealth had been paid. The bride's brother regarded the exchange as complete, but said that the bride's group would have demanded full payment if the groom's father had been alive.

The couple express intent to marry in a church but it is doubtful whether this will happen and even if it does, no additional payment will be made. In February 1964 the groom prepared a customary feast known as pene to mark the birth of his first child but this was not part of the bride-wealth. It was shared by the bride's father, brother, and the other household head of the Joremba'embo lineage in Inonda and her mother's brother from Ajoro. [585] [851]

583 [851] These people were expected to return a feast of similar size for the groom, in contrast to the bride-wealth for which no return payment is expected.

VII

583 613 The economic consequences of the payment were greatest in four households - those of the groom and his parallel cousin, both of Jegotumo lineage, who contributed most; and those of the bride's father and brother, both of Joremba'embo lineage, who received most. Other households' contributions to, and shares of, the payment were minor by comparison. Members of a lineage did not act as a unit for the purpose of the marriage, nor was each member expected to contribute to, or share equally in, the payment, or even to contribute in proportion to his wealth.

583 614 This was not an ideal situation in which to investigate the extent to which the Andiriha clan functions as a unit, because the marriage was within the clan. However, it was by no means a clan affair. On the one hand, Andiriha households from Hanakiro, a village distant from Inonda, took no part, and on the other, heads of households which participated in the exchange were drawn from about 20 different clans. Households from Andiriha lineages other than those of the bride and groom did not contribute significantly more to, or receive significantly larger shares of, the payment than households of other clans.

583 602 The range of genealogical connections between the groom and heads of contributing households was extremely diverse and there was a similarly wide range of relationships in the recipient group. It is therefore difficult to determine with accuracy the extent to which genealogical relationships influence obligations between households and also the extent to which a particular type of genealogical relationship implies a particular degree of obligation. Adoptive relationships and distance between households appear to modify the extent to which genealogical relationships entail obligations.

583 621 Co-residence in a village may also have some influence. Some people, though not all, from each of Kakendetta, Hohota I, Hohota II and Urio villages contributed to the payment, but nobody from these villages received a share. On the other hand, no member of Hosou, Ajoro, Sewa or Jegerata - villages which received parts of the payment - made a contribution. Inonda was the only village in which there were both contributors and recipients. This may indicate that membership of a particular village was a factor determining the group with which a household was aligned and may

even have been sufficient qualification for admission to a group, but without precise and comprehensive genealogical information this cannot be asserted. It is possible, for example, that some households could trace approximately equivalent but very distant genealogical relationships to both bride and groom, and that place of residence then determined the group with which they were aligned. 583 621

Williams (1930:137) describes a marriage payment typical of the mid-1920s. It included no cash and the traditional valuable would have been worth only $10.00 at 1962 prices. The traditional valuables in the bride-wealth described here were worth about three times as much and in addition $80.00 in cash was included. The people clearly regarded the cash as the most important component. Those genealogically and residentially closest to the groom contributed most cash; there was considerable formality associated with the payment of it; and in discussions of the bride-wealth the dominant topic was the cash component. The bride's father and brother received most of the cash but only a small proportion of the traditional valuables and they showed little interest in the latter. Households with lesser claims generally received items other than cash. The importance of traditional valuables in marriage payments has therefore declined markedly as a result of the introduction of cash to the economy. 583 497 178

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preliminary planning. One may walk to the coast at any time and obtain sea-shells by purchase or barter. Moreover, many people now place a higher value on imported objects, both ornamental and utilitarian.

Nevertheless, hambo and di still have a value. A man derives prestige from being "rich in hambo", a wedding is not complete without the exchange of valuables, and a man is not properly dressed for important festivals unless he is adorned with hambo and di. Moreover, one is sometimes forced to acquire hambo, as in the case of a relatively wealthy man in a neighbouring village who cannot decline the requests of relatives (in Inonda and elsewhere) to give them cash for hambo to enable them to pay their tax.

In a bride-price exchange which we observed a total of £41.0.0 was given in cash, plus £13.19.0 worth of hambo and di. It is significant to note that it was the closest relatives who gave cash (or cash and valuables) and generally the more distant ones (or close ones who had no access to cash) who gave traditional valuables. Likewise the most important of the recipients kept the cash, and the traditional valuables were distributed to the more distant kin.(1) At a birthday feast which we observed only cash was contributed.(2) It is apparent that money is now of greater importance than hambo and di even in local ceremonial activity.

The total value of traditional valuables held in the village is less than that of cash savings (see p. 54). Savings in cash amount to 24% of annual cash income in the village and the remainder of the income is used for current expenses. Cash circulates much more rapidly than valuables and is used for a greater variety of transactions. It is likely that the relative importance of cash will continue to increase.

Income and expenditure

Details of cash income and expenditure were collected in respect of the first eight months of the year and are

(1) For a fuller report on this wedding see Hogbin, 1963.

(2) See Crocombe, 1963.

There is a clear hierarchy of priorities among the various activities with which the Inonda people can occupy their time. Serious illness, of course, precludes any other activity. Unless suffering from illness the men give priority to wage labour (in most instances this was heavy manual work). In the absence of paid work, social obligations connected with life crises take precedence over all other activities (except the harvesting of food). During our survey, men spent an average of 15.3 hours weekly on social obligations associated with life crises, and on travel (which is generally related to social obligations) and women 23.0 hours. During events associated with life crises people do undertake subsistence activities, but almost exclusively harvesting and hunting to provide food for the festivities.(1) If there are no life crises in the offing then priority is given to clearing, planting and weeding the gardens in order to ensure the food supply. Thereafter, free time may be used for cash cropping, the making of artifacts, or leisure.

The effect of life crises on cash cropping was markedly different from that on paid labour. During the survey, villagers who were not engaged in paid labour spent a considerable amount of time preparing for a puberty ceremony and a birthday feast and did not work on their cash crops during the periods of preparation. When a villager died, for the three weeks of mourning following his death, nobody worked on cash crops as this would have been contrary to accepted codes of respect for the dead. Those who were engaged in wage labour, on the other hand, did not take any time off to prepare for either the birthday feast or the puberty ceremony, though they did assist in their off hours. When the death occurred, the employees, including a son of the deceased, took only two days off before resuming their jobs. The cultural restrictions on productive activity during a period of mourning, and the obligation to give priority to feast preparations over economic pursuits,

(1) An interesting instance of the adaptation of traditional obligations to serve modern economic ends was noticed during our stay. It is common for a prospective groom to assist his prospective father-in-law with housebuilding or bush-clearing. One ex-Inonda man who had taken a block in the government resettlement scheme got his prospective son-in-law (who lived in Inonda) to work in his (the father-in-law's) coffee garden. As the son-in-law was socially of lower standing than the bride and as he was more anxious about the match than she, the father-in-law was able to derive several weeks free labour from both the groom and his sister, with occasional help from their mother and other relatives.

19: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

write Y1/Y2 as men/women. De Coppet deals with the relations: murderer's clan/victim's clan and wife giver/wife taker. Schwimmer (1973) adds: land giver/land taker; human partner/spirit partner. In all these cases the equivalence rules give values for X1, X2.

The second type of constitutive rules specific to ritual prestations are 'translation rules', i.e. rules about the translation of sentiments into prestations and about inferring sentiments from prestations received. These rules are elicited by asking informants *why* gifts were made. (In Orokaiva, the nearest equivalent of *why*? is *do eto*?, meaning: what having been done, what having been?) I found that (except for identical return gifts), such questions were usually answered in terms of sentiments felt or professed by the donor towards the recipient. Bridewealth was always explained as a way of appeasing the wife-givers' anger at the taking away of their daughter. This anger is not just in the wife-taker's mind but is expressed by the wife-givers by certain stock actions and phrases (as in any joking relation) behind which there are individual variations in genuine attachment to the daughter, genuine aversion to the affines and shrewd calculation. To give another example, many feasts are made in order to restore amity between groups, in which case the small preliminary gift of betel nut and food accompanying the invitation (*sope ikari*, Schwimmer 1973: 151) would stand for an offer of amity (translation rule) and acceptance of the invitation would signify the prospective guests' willingness to forget past grudges.

Semantically, gifts encode sentiments in many ways: by what is given, how much, of what quality, in what manner, where, when, in the context of what relationship and so on.[2] The recipient decodes: he reads the donor's sentiments in the prestation—the only language that, in the cultures discussed here, does not lie. Words are not to be trusted: but a gift is sacred like a statement under oath. Sentiments do not, of course, objectively explain gifts but the translation rules specify what message a particular gift conveys about the donor's sentiments. While social anthropology may not be interested in sentiments as such, it should be interested in the codes in which they are ritually expressed and in which the receiver is urged to change his own sentiments. To the extent that the principle of reciprocity has weight in a society, conflict will tend to be resolved by prestations that will re-establish sentiments of amity rather than by the interpretation of (often ambiguous) rules of law. Such prestations recompense the distress caused rather than the torts committed.

The rest of this article will present an example of semiotic analysis of an exchange system. This analysis, based on Orokaiva data, starts (part II) by investigating terminology used in discourse about gifts, debts, exchange and reciprocity. It explores the relation between the constitutive rules and the ideology of reciprocity.[3] The second step in analysis (part III) will relate this ideology to the overall Orokaiva world-view, thus demonstrating that the principle of reciprocity is not an observer-improvised category but an integral part of the conceptual system. Finally (part IV), we shall consider the relation between the constitutive rules and transactional practices and test Sahlins's theory of exchange against the semiotic analysis of Orokaiva data.

but would estimate plantings to be about 4,000 trees, occupying an area of eight acres.

Among resources which produce significant current income in Sivepe and Inonda, two other types must be briefly mentioned here, though they must be more fully discussed elsewhere. Income is earned by men who are normally resident in the villages. When these men are married and living away from the village with their families, they provide support to the home people on critical occasions and also, when villagers pay visits to them. I briefly met a few Sivepe men who settled in Port Moresby and these men were called upon, during the year of my study, to pay several plane fares and feed several men who tried their luck in looking for jobs in Port Moresby.

Secondly, men who return to the village after outside employment are bringing savings into the village which forms a significant source of revenue. Such savings often form part of the bride-wealth paid by clansmen and it is thus the affines who spend it. During the year, four Sivepe men went to Port Moresby for employment and three returned; one Sivepe man took up a job on a plantation for awhile, largely to pay overdue taxes; a number of men ordinarily working outside came home for short visits. Probably the most regular income is derived from absentees when the men go out to work by themselves, leaving their wives and children behind in the village. Six such split families existed in Sivepe; in every case, regular envelopes containing money were posted to the wife. In the cases I investigated, eight to ten envelopes arrived in a year, each containing $10 and sometimes $20. These envelopes represent a considerable percentage of village income. As long as the money keeps coming, a man knows that his relations will closely watch his wife and will carry out obligations towards his affines; thus, his wife will be kept under strong moral constraint from all sides. It would be cynical to explain the generosity with which men maintain their wives wholly by such motives, but the Orokaiva do regard "looking after" the wives of absentees as a valuable service and the envelopes are thus a form of repayment. "Looking after" the wife and children, indeed, comprises a wide range of services which must be performed by men of the lineage and which are a reasonable charge against the income of a wage earner. As most places of employment in Papua-New Guinea do not provide for married accommodation, we may regard villagers and migrants as engaged in a joint economic enterprise in which each group performs services and obtains benefits.

At the time of the eruption several Sivepe men were working on plantations; today, Sivepe people are interested only in the better-paid town jobs, mostly in Port Moresby. In Inonda, however, two men often take up short spells of plantation work while a third, trained as a driver by an anthropologist, has a regular government job in Popondetta.

461 be acquired without too much hard labour or threat to status, and only
436 if its acquisition does not involve foregoing other more highly valued
437 benefits. Thus, the market has a great elasticity of supply: when
435 the price seems right to the Orokaiva, supply suddenly emerges from all directions; when the price is lowered, there is suddenly no supply at all. The investment of effort is at once directed into different avenues: subsistence gardening, house-building, a project for the mission, or a hall for the women's club, or a hunting expedition, or practises for a dance.

177 Comparison with Inonda: In this section I have discussed a small
184 number of acculturation variables as they apply to Sivepe. In general they apply to Inonda also, but there are a few minor differences to be mentioned. The most important of these is that whereas one can speak, in Sivepe, about a certain stage in acculturation reached by the community, it is less easy to do the same for Inonda where, at one end of the scale, we find fairly young men without cash-cropping skills, without school education, and almost entirely aloof from the money economy, while at the other end, one man has become a government driver and would need to be considered, in every respect, as more acculturated than any man of the same age group at Sivepe. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that acculturation in Sivepe was homogeneous; nor that the conservatism of part of Inonda is necessarily a long-term phenomenon.

There is no difference in food habits between the two villages, except that the government driver, having more money, eats better. In respect to clothing, it seemed that in Sivepe young women are a little more prone to cover their breasts than in Inonda; this is of course very much a matter of fashion and can change in months. With regard to housing, changes were actually occurring during the year I was in the field. Houses were being enlarged up to approximately the Sivepe size, and this programme was explained to me as due to the forthcoming feast at which the Seva people were invited and the new floor space was needed to accommodate them. The argument was thus not quite the same as at Sivepe, where the larger houses were thought of as a necessary part of "iji eha," the new age. "Timber" was not used in Inonda, all the walls being of sago. The "timber" fashion never travelled as far East as Inonda; I doubt whether Inonda had enough suitable trees and, furthermore, Inonda did not have the same shortage of sago. Though sago was rare on Inonda lands, the residents had a plentiful supply from other lands belonging to relatives. At Inonda, only some of the people used rubbish holes, whereas the others threw their refuse into the bush. On the other hand, the village was most plentifully and attractively laid out with shrubs and ornamental plants. Inonda, built a special feast house for their visitors from Seva, whereas Sivepe did not do so for their visitors from Togahou. This definitely reflected a non-traditional attitude in Sivepe.

177 In the attitude to money, and to education, Inonda was clearly
436 split between the traditionalist and the modern faction. The modern faction was, in fact more money-oriented than were the Sivepe people.

●583

177 The clearest example of this was in the computation of bride price.
436 As I mentioned, the Sivepa people, in calculating the value of bride
583 price, translated all gifts of trade goods (clothes, kitchen utensils, etc.) into money terms, speaking of a bride price of 72 pounds when the actual cash component was only $28. (The word "dollar" is well-known to Orokaiva but as yet imperfectly accepted in discourse as a unit of value.) Inonda, however, in calculating the value of bride price, went further and converted also the pigs, valuables and tapa cloths into money terms, as was described in Hogbin, 1966. Upon inquiring specifically whether the Inonda people calculated bride-wealth in this way, I found that Hogbin's presentation corresponded with the Inonda method of estimating. In other words, Inonda people spoke of a 100-pound brideprice, when the actual gifts were as follows:

Cash	$ 80.00
Household goods	13.00
Pig	60.00
Bark-cloth	9.75
Food	10.60
Traditional valuables	28.20
Total	$201.55

Sivepa people expressed some horror at the thought that this should be referred to as a $200 bride price; to them the gifts of pig, bark-cloth, food and traditional valuables were gifts of a special type that could not be equated with money. I asked one informant whether this was perhaps a modern trend; "not modern but silly," he replied.

177 This reply reminds us how hazardous it is to place a number of
184 phenomena, found in different villages, on a unilinear kind of acculturation continuum. Nonetheless, I believe that the facts show some tendency for Sivepa to be more "acculturated" than Inonda, even though the differences are slight, and apply only to part of the Inonda population.

Section 12: Impact of External Influences on Community Organisation

184 One of the difficulties of our research design is that Sivepa
621 and Inonda are of different population size, Sivepa having exactly three times the population of Inonda (135: 45). Hence, the community organisation of the two villages would naturally differ for that [614] reason alone. A second difference lies in the clan composition of the two villages and the changes in clan composition over the period under consideration. Pamba contained three clans: Seho, Jegase and Timumu and modern Sivepa still contains roughly the same family alignment except that the members of the Timumu clan are now calling themselves

CHAPTER II: Socio-Economic Factors

Section 1: Age, Sex and Marital Status

In this chapter, the study of internal variations will be continued, by a consideration of the human resources available to the villages and their economic productivity. A statistical analysis of the population by age, sex and marital status (see Table 16)[A] shows that the labour force lacks a proportionate number of young men in early adulthood; the number of men in the vigour of life is somewhat smaller, in Sivepa, than the number of women. The reason for this change is that young men leave the village to earn money elsewhere. They often do this before marriage, so that the bachelors' houses tend to be occupied by a much smaller number than formerly; but after they are married they usually do not at once settle down in the village. It is unusual nowadays for a bridepri.e to be paid in full at the time of the wedding. Usually this payment is delayed; the young husband goes out to work for it and after one or two years he sends back money and it is paid. At the one brideprice payment I observed in Sivepa, the groom was not even present. He was at his job in Port Moresby and the role of groom was taken over by another man from the same lineage--a married man with six children, as it happened, who duly cut the firewood and carried the water required for the entertainment of his affines. Even after the bridewealth is paid, then, the husband continues to work at his job, rarely seeing his wife as travel is expensive and leave infrequently granted.

Because of these infrequent visits, young wives have few children, but they receive regular gifts of money from their husband. Eventually, the husband returns home; it is hard to say just what makes him decide. Before the age of 30 he usually starts to establish a family, and he then stays home continuously, to look after his garden and hi- coffee. He may occasionally go back to town for a few months to earn money, but judging by the few examples I saw, he is not always successful at finding a job and even if he does so, he takes an early opportunity or uses an early excuse, to return home, carrying home some presents for his family and perhaps a little money. The family does not seem to be too troubled about the loss of earnings that result from his return. Some men manage to find accommodation for their families in town, in which case they all migrate.

This generalised picture needs qualifying. There were six Sivepa women (out of nine married women with absent husbands) who received regular gifts; three of these women were living in the household of a single man while another family head had under his control two

A [See Cat. 116, pp. 221-222--Analyst]

CHAPTER IV: Acculturation at the Time of Resettlement

177 My concern in this chapter is not to discuss acculturation in general, which has been done already in earlier chapters, but to consider the variations in degree of acculturation that existed between individuals and groups in the sample villages. This is an issue of some importance as the main line of change has not been so much that wholly new culture elements were introduced between 1951 and the present (though there were some of these, too) but that culture elements accepted by an élite in 1951 have become generally accepted today, while other elements again are now in the stage of being accessible to an élite of the younger generation.

There are many innovations which can be adopted by Orokaiva only on a village basis. I have already referred to the changes in house design; such changes were never made individually, though less conspicuous changes (the use of nails rather than bark twine) may be [881] made by an individual. The abandonment of initiation ceremonies can likewise occur only on the basis of a corporate decision. At Sivepe they were abandoned after the war; on the other hand, girls' puberty seclusion and the subsequent ostentatious "coming out party" continued. Also, male initiation was widely replaced by a custom called a "birthday party" which was given to every boy of the age of nine or ten.

● [583] Similarly, the inclusion of money in bridewealth is an innovation which, [436] once made in a homogeneous community, is bound to become standard practise. In Sivepe the first such payment was amassed in 1950 and the median payment has been $24 since, without much upward trend, while in Inonda the leading family raised the rate well above this.

On the other hand, much change was the result of individual decisions which were gradually followed by enough individuals to make them into a change of general norm. Thus, girls' puberty seclusion used to last from three to six months; today, it often lasts no longer than three weeks while in Inonda, I was told, it is still shorter. In Sivepe, girls are usually still at school when the first menses begin. The Australian school teacher was most disturbed about the mysterious disappearance of his senior girls at this time and their dubious excuses when they returned to school, which however they did not always do. Until I told him, he did not fully realise that puberty seclusion was still practised in the villages; nobody had told him as they feared he might try to stamp out this custom. Some individuals keep their daughters secluded for months, even today.

797 At the time of the eruption no baptisms had yet occurred at
798 Inonda, and only one, as far as I can find out, in Sivepe--and this man settled at Agenahambo later after a failed marriage. For the Inonda people, the nearest school was at Seva, and one boy (now the
871

CHAPTER IX: Adherence to Tradition

Section 1: Conflicts Between Two Conceptual Systems

181 The Orokaiva of today has to act in conformity with two
177 conceptual systems, one attributed to the ancestors and the other imposed by the mission and, to some extent, by the government. Essentially the system followed today is that attributed to the ancestors, but changes have been very numerous. These changes have mostly been conceptualised as substitutions and additions of the old system, leaving its essentials intact. At the same time, these substitutions have been calculated to ward off criticism from mission and government, and to cope with changed conditions.

551 There is, for instance, a taboo on using the names of affines.
178 When the government pressed for the amalgamation of villages, affines frequently found themselves residents of the same village, which made the name taboo very awkward. The custom now is that the taboo is greatly relaxed for Christians; the baptismal name has only a mild taboo attached to it, while the severe taboo on the Orokaiva name bestowed at birth has remained unchanged. In dealings with Europeans, who do not respect the taboo (even though affines of a person are present), only the baptismal name is used. In the village, the Orokaiva names are now heard very rarely indeed.

464 The temporary labour migration of young men (who sometimes
167 leave wives behind in the village) continues a traditional pattern of behaviour as young men used to go out in the same circumstances to
178 hunt heads, but it is money they now bring back before they settle down. Bridewealth gifts have remained conceptually as they were before: there must be a pig or pigs, bark cloth, ritual valuables
178 such as shell necklaces and feathers, cooking pots, but in addition
583 new wealth is necessary: store clothes, "knives and forks" (i.e., kitchenware) and money. Here again, a change in detail has not changed the basic conception of the gift but rather has updated the details.

852 There used to be a ceremony to which a boy was subjected at
179 or just before adolescence. This was the time when the boy formally assumed clothing. The boy used to be given his perineal band (bo) by some adult male cognate, often the man by whom the boy had been named. (Williams, 1930: 98) Nowadays, boys wear clothing much earlier in life, but the ceremony is still held as an occasion for honouring the child. It is now called a "birthday party"; as such it has the blessing of the mission while at the same time an essential part of a boy's life cycle is preserved.

731 Immediately after the eruption, the Sangara people decided to waive all bridewealth, so that a large percentage of the women in [583] Hohorita were married without one. At the present time, bridewealth is reinstated, and young men go to neighbouring plantations, which are [464] plentiful--or else further abroad--to earn them. While many husbands worked outside Hohorita, most of them were able to return home at [595] weekends. Polygamy was pronounced before the eruption, but it seems that the polygamists became victims of the eruption and polygamy no longer exists as a recognised institution.

871 If the average educational standard at Hohorita is slightly above that of Sivepa, the reasons are: better facilities during the years 1945-1951, loss of many members of the older age groups in the eruption, special efforts made by Bishop Hand at Irihambo to draw Sangara into mission teaching. This higher standard is reflected in the statistics of persons who at one time or another have been in skilled occupations. (Table 21)[A] The persons who returned to Hohorita 434 did so with the express idea of making some money out of coffee; the average income from coffee in Hohorita is certainly far in excess of that in Sivepa (about $100 per annum).

871 Hohorita does feel that it is held back by the present educational provisions which are little better than those in Inonda and much inferior to those at Sasembata. (At Hohorita, there is no schooling beyond Standard 3, whereas Sasembata goes up to Standard 6.) Hohorita people compare the school unfavourably with the government school at the Sangara resettlement block which offers Standard 6, and which, furthermore, has more highly qualified teachers on the staff. My own impression was that the head teacher at Hohorita is a very good man; some of the criticism of him is no doubt due to spite, for he is of local origin. Still, the general criticism of facilities at Hohorita is not unjust.

621 Hohorita is less homogeneous in ethnic origin than the other 563 villages discussed, as the population is drawn from different parts 592 of the Sangara tribe and intermarriage with other tribes has been frequent. The explanation may be found in the pressure, after the disaster, to find mates when most preferred potential marriage partners had died in the eruption. This breaking down of the endogamous emphasis after wars and disasters is, as I pointed out earlier, traditional among the Orokaiva.

423 Heterogeneity was countered to some extent by an arrangement 591 which was, according to informants, made by a popular meeting shortly 582 after the eruption. According to this arrangement women who married outside Sangara, would be allowed the same land rights as though they had been sons. This was done in an effort, so I was told, to add men to the depleted Sangara population. Men would thus be encouraged to settle on Sangara land rather than take their Sangara wives home with them. Two men from the Sasembata district are now living in Hohorita under this arrangement. They keep up normal exchange relations with their home district, e.g., I know one of them lent hambo for the kere

A [See Cat. 116, p. 228--Analyst]

26: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1974
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

Orokaiva marriage (Schwimmer, 1970) and have shown that sister-exchange marriage, though infrequent, is regarded as the ideal form. Elopement and abduction marriages, once the most frequent, are now frowned upon, though elopement is still prevalent. The patrilateral preference rule (marrying out a girl in her mother's village) is still regularly stated by informants. In my records, which go back to the third generation, I found that 35% of the resident married women had been married out by that rule for the whole three generations, i.e., they had been exchanged for their mothers and their mothers for their grandmothers.

In the study [2] that follows, I shall first present data concerning the coconut and areca, then about the taro. I shall follow this presentation with a brief discussion about the relation between the levels of myth and ritual.

1. COCONUT AND ARECA

A salient characteristic of the ethnobotany of the Orokaiva is the classification of plants as masculine and feminine. Certain important cultivars are grouped together as opposite-sex couples and grown in close association with one another. Claims are made that such plants will not prosper unless they are planted close together and that, in their wild state, they are also found together.

The symbolic association of these pairs of plants may be based on a number of shared characteristics: the similar outward appearance of the fruit, a coincidence in the time of fruiting, and similarities in culinary use, taste, and supposed physiological effects of the fruit when eaten. Sometimes the pairs of plants are linked in ritual use and in a common myth.

Coconut and areca are planted together in villages as well as gardens. Both nuts are eaten raw between meals; both grow on palms; both are offered to visitors—the coconut as refreshment immediately upon arrival and the areca (along with *hingi* pepper and lime) for chewing during the conversation. At mortuary feasts coconut and areca are the principal gifts, offered in large quantities to guests from villages who helped to bury

26: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1974
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

the dead person. At ordinary harvest feasts and bride-wealth payments they are seen on display platforms along with taro and other vegetables. They are then subsidiary to taro and pigs, which are the main food gifts, but at mortuary feasts vast quantities are given, saved from the dead man's palms, which are made taboo until this feast. Dry coconut and areca are strewn on graves by affines of the deceased.

The distinctive features perceived by Orokaiva in each species should also be summarized. Coconut is believed to be a valuable adjunct to the diet of children and dogs (also chickens). In Orokaiva myths, its miraculous effect on children and dogs is often described. To the scientific observer this effect is natural enough as coconut is an important source of first-class protein for both children and dogs, who otherwise do not get much first-class protein. Coconut oil is used as a cosmetic for hair and body not only to enhance beauty but also for its magical efficacy, for the purification of man-slayers (Williams, 1930: 175, 207), and for women who are being initiated or who welcome visitors at dances. In all such cases it is the task of a male to pour the coconut milk over the persons whose magical protection is intended.

Areca, a mildly hallucinogenic fruit, is chewed by women as much as by men. When friends are sitting together, it is shared in much the same way as beer among white Australians. People offer nuts to each other but expect to come out approximately even. Visitors from other villages expect to be offered areca by their hosts. Its main physiological effect is to create a dreamy amiability and to break down hostility that might otherwise exist. Its magical uses, mostly in association with some medicine of more specific purpose, are too many to enumerate. A girl carries a bunch of areca at the ceremony which ends her seclusion after first menstruation. She normally offers it to her man at lovers' meetings.

Although I have a number of coconut and areca myths on record, I shall discuss here only one, the fullest one, which illustrates my argument most clearly. A beautiful girl, noted for her remarkable breasts, had the misfortune of killing all the young men with whom she slept. Her breasts pricked and killed them.

27: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

is the contemporary case where money replaces traditional valuables. Is this money a 'use value'? Anthropologists have often analyzed it as such and not without some justification; the Orokaiva for instance present brideprice banknotes tied one by one to a tall sapling carried aloft by the donor and thus transported to the wifegiver. After presentation it is often stored in wait for other similar occasions. The fact is, however, that eventually this treasure is converted into exchange values. Furthermore, it owes its status as a valuable to its potential exchange value. It is therefore more easily accounted for in the preset four-system method of analysis as will appear later.

The same remark may be made in respect of labour assistance between households which is normally given without payments except for a meal at the end of the day. If, however, the service is given in connection with work for which the person assisted will eventually get paid, then the service falls within a different category and must be paid for. The same rule applies to the granting of land useholds for which no rent is ever demanded if the land produces (only) use values, but the situation changes when it produces exchange values. Use value is therefore a concept determining Orokaiva behaviour.

Finally, it is as true of the Orokaiva as of the ancient Greeks that conflict and war (*isoro*) did not have a necessarily negative connotation connotation. They might be bad or good according to circumstances. War, sorcery and other forms of negative reciprocity are part of this mode of production; they cannot be equated to 'alienation'. There is increasing evidence that Levi-Strauss (1943) was correct in viewing war in these societies as a modality of interdependence.

To sum up, the Orokaiva had a basic classification of *pure* as between subsistence and feasting. An inspection of the crop by the feast-giver was needed to let crops pass from the subsistence to the feasting category. (It was not done if the harvest was insufficient.) The term *pure ari*, whatever its customary translation into English, was never used to denote any kind of effectiveness in ensuring a food supply. In case of garden failure, people did not ascribe it to neglectful *pure ari* but rather to neglectful *simbari*. It is the demigods of the various crops and the ancestors who do the actual producing in the garden, and all that is expected of man is to clear, to plant and to protect against magical and technical dangers. Watchfulness is the key; toil is a consequence. A flawless garden testifies to watchfulness in the first instance; to physical prowess also, but only in the second instance. In this respect i.e. the technical as well as the magical watchfulness, *pure ari* is intermediate between the Greek concepts of EPΓON and TEXNH.